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TREND GROWTH DURATIONS & SHIFTS
INNA GRINIS*
Abstract. Policymakers and investors often conceptualize trend growth as simply
a medium/long term average growth rate. In practice, these averages are usually
taken over arbitrary periods of time, thereby ignoring the large empirical growth
literature which shows that doing so is inappropriate, especially in developing countries
where growth is highly unstable. This paper builds on this literature to propose
an algorithm, called “iterative Fit and Filter” (iFF), that extracts the trend as a
sequence of medium/long term growth averages. iFF separates important country-
speciﬁc historical episodes and trend growth durations - number of years between two
consecutive trend growth shifts, vary substantially across countries and over time. We
relate the conditional probabilities of up and down-shifts in trend growth next year
to the country’s current growth environment, level of development, demographics,
institutions, economic management and external shocks, and show how both iFF and
the predictive model could be employed in practice.
Keywords: Economic Growth, Duration Analysis, Trend Shifts, Trend Extraction
1. Introduction
“The instability of growth rates makes talk of the growth rate
almost meaningless.”
Lant Pritchett [33]
Many developed and developing countries have been growing at a slower pace since
at least the late 2000s. Which ones will continue at a low trend growth rate for another
several years? Where could the situation get even worse before it gets any better, and
where is a rebound in trend growth imminent?
Such questions are of great interest to many policymakers and investors. However,
addressing them in practice is rather challenging for two main reasons. Trend growth
is inherently unobserved, with no consensus among economists on how it should be
extracted from growth time series data, and a large number of domestic and external
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2factors come into interplay at the very same time, and could either shift the current
trend growth rate up, or down, or counterbalance each other and make the country
vibrate around the existing trend for another several years.
This paper aims to develop an empirical framework which allows us to address the
following two questions: What is the trend growth rate at which a country is currently
growing? How likely is it to shift and in what direction?
Although numerous sophisticated ways of extracting the trend component from growth
time series by applying linear, nonlinear, univariate, multivariate ﬁlters and other tech-
niques exist (cf., e.g., French [20]), very often, we still want to think about trend growth
as merely a medium/long term average growth rate. Despite its simplicity, this latter
deﬁnition leads to an important practical issue: given a time series of growth rates over
what periods of time should the averages be taken?
This issue is rarely addressed explicitly, and averages are often taken over subjectively
deﬁned periods of time, decades, the whole sample of data that one has access to, etc.,
thereby ignoring the large empirical growth literature that started in the 1990s with
the seminal contributions of Easterly et al. [15] and Pritchett [33], and which shows
that employing “arbitrarily chosen long-run average growth rates fails to take account
of a very important ‘stylised fact’ of economic growth, i.e., while the growth process of
“developed” economies is well characterized by such a single long run average growth
rate (with a “business cycle” around this trend) this is not true of most countries in
the world, many of whom exhibit multiple structural breaks in growth rates” (Kar,
Pritchett, Raihan, and Sen [29], henceforth KPRS).
Our paper builds on the insights and techniques of this empirical growth literature
to ﬁrst propose a methodology for extracting the trend as a sequence of medium/long
term average growth rates taken such that a shift in trend growth, whenever it hap-
pens, satisﬁes economic signiﬁcance thresholds, and the trend shift dates identiﬁed are
optimally located in a growth time series. This method, called the “iterative Fit and
Filter” (iFF), generalizes the “Fit and Filter” (FF) approach developed in KPRS [29]
to identify breaks in growth time series. iFF preserves the merits of the original FF, in
particular, the ability to identify a much larger number of breaks in the presence of high
growth volatility than purely statistical methods (Bai-Perron [9, 8]), but overcomes the
problem of having to postulate a somewhat arbitrary maximum number of breaks in the
ﬁrst step and the fact that, unlike in purely statistical methods, the ﬁnal break dates
identiﬁed by the original FF are not necessarily optimally located. A simple example
illustrates how both issues matter for whether or not a potential shift date is identiﬁed
as true.
3iFF is therefore a general method which only requires the researcher to specify two
parameters: a minimum number of years over which the averages have to be taken
(minimum trend growth duration) and the economic signiﬁcance threshold(s) for the
trend growth shifts (trend shifts signiﬁcance ﬁlter). Both parameters should depend on
how the researcher deﬁnes trend growth for the purpose of his analysis and the type of
trend growth dynamics he is interested in understanding and predicting. In this paper,
we are interested in medium/long term trend growth and therefore impose a minimum
trend growth duration of ﬁve years. We also employ the economic signiﬁcance thresholds
proposed in the original FF which have the advantage of recognizing the non-linearity
in the growth process by distinguishing between a trend shift in the same direction (e.g.
up-shift after up-shift), in which case a 1% point change is enough for signiﬁcance, and
a shift in the opposite direction (e.g. down-shift after up-shift) where the trend has to
change by at least 3% points for a signiﬁcant shift.
Applying iFF with these parameters on a sample of 153 developed and developing
countries, we ﬁnd that it separates important country-speciﬁc historical episodes, and
that trend growth durations - number of years between two consecutive trend growth
shifts - vary substantially both across countries and for a given country over time. We
discuss in some details the experiences of several countries both to illustrate what iFF
identiﬁes in practice and to suggest how it could potentially be employed in economic
history research where arbitrarily taken averages are still very often the norm.
Despite the heterogeneity of country experiences, several characteristics seem to
clearly distinguish the overall trend growth process in developing countries from the
one followed by developed economies. For instance, we ﬁnd that although growth is
twice as volatile in developing countries as in developed ones, trend growth is almost
three times as volatile and therefore accounts for a larger proportion of the overall
growth variance. The probability that we will have to wait for 10 years or more be-
tween two consecutive trend growth shifts in a developing country is only 31% versus
72% for a developed economy. Moreover, the median absolute magnitude of a trend
growth shift in a developing economy is 5.45% points versus 2.3% points in a developed
counterpart. These ﬁndings agree with previous research (e.g. Pritchett [33], Aguiar
and Gopinath [4]) that documents and investigates the distinction between the smooth
and stable growth paths of developed economies and the discontinuous growth patterns
in developing countries.
To address our second motivating question - “How likely is trend growth to shift and
in what direction?” - we model and estimate the conditional probabilities of trend
growth up and down-shifts next year, conditional on the country having already grown
at the current trend growth rate since the last trend shift. In competing risks models
4(an extended form of duration/survival analysis with several possible types of events
instead of one), these latter objects are known as cause-speciﬁc discrete-time hazard
rates (cf., for instance, Allison [6]).
Several empirical growth papers have already employed duration techniques. For
instance, Mora and Siotis [32] estimate a discrete-time duration model to analyse how
external factors aﬀect recovery prospects in developing economies. Berg et al. [12]
and Hausmann et al. [24] employ continuous-time duration analysis to investigate the
determinants of the duration of growth spells and growth stagnations respectively. The
main advantage of the duration methodology is that it allows researchers to incorporate
unﬁnished/censored episodes into their analysis. In our case, this issue is crucial because
all current trend growth episodes are censored. The only thing we know about them
is that they have already lasted up until this year. What we do not know and are
interested in, is whether the country will continue growing at the current trend growth
rate for another several years or experience a trend growth shift next year and in what
direction. Duration techniques overcome this problem by focusing on the hazard rate,
which, in reality, is just a diﬀerent representation of the distribution of durations but
is unaﬀected by random censoring (cf. for instance Allignol et al. [5]). The random
censoring assumption is satisﬁed if the fact that the growth episode is censored does
not provide additional information for whether the country is more or less likely to
experience a trend shift next year, which is the case in our setting since our sample
ends in 2015 for all countries.
Historically, duration analysis, especially for competing risks, was ﬁrst mainly de-
veloped in a continuous-time setting (Allison [6]). However, already in his seminal
paper, where Cox [13] introduced the partial likelihood method for the estimation of
the proportional hazards model, he noted that a continuous-time approach may become
problematic if the data contains an “appreciable number of ties” - events recorded as
happening at the same time. It is, of course, possible to assume that time is continuous
and events are simply “grouped” into discrete time intervals and use approximations in
the estimation. In our case, however, we believe that considering time as intrinsically
discrete, i.e. “ties [as] real, not spurious” (Grambsch and Therneau [21]), is more appro-
priate since we are directly working with annual data and a large number of countries
experience trend shifts simultaneously.
Moreover, a discrete-time approach has the advantage of giving results that are easier
to interpret economically. In discrete time, the hazards are conditional probabilities,
whereas in continuous time, they are rates and can therefore be bigger than one. For
instance, in our case, working in discrete time leads to modelling the conditional prob-
abilities of trend growth shifting up/down next year, conditional on the current trend
5growth episode having lasted up to this year. If we were to employ a continuous-time
approach, we would be estimating the conditional rates at which trend growth episodes
end with up/down-shifts per survival year, something that seems to be less intuitive.
Examining a large set of covariates related to the growth environment, the level of
development, demographics, institutions, political stability, economic management, and
external shocks, we ﬁnd, for instance, that while better institutions and higher domestic
savings may protect countries from trend down-shifts, higher youth and old dependency
ratios are detrimental to trend growth, increasing down-shift risks and hindering up-
shifts. Several systemic forces, such as higher average gold and rising food prices (except
for food exporters), as well as higher and rising US T-bill rates increase the relative
trend growth down-shift risks across the globe. A rise in domestic conﬂict, credit and
inﬂation may act as catalysts for trend growth down-shifts, whereas devaluations, if not
too large, may give a positive impetus to trend growth.
As Pritchett and Summers [33], we also ﬁnd that “regression to the mean is the
empirically most salient feature of economic growth”. Whatever the speciﬁcation, a one
percentage point higher trend rate increases the relative down-shift risk and reduces
the relative up-shift risk by over 20%, while, on its own, the trend growth rate explains
almost 10% of all trend shifts.
We then use the insights from our exploratory analysis to construct a parsimonious
model which relates the up and down-shift hazards to 20 diﬀerent covariates, and esti-
mate the 2016 conditional probabilities of up and down-shifts in trend growth for 120
countries in our sample. These hazards estimates, together with the 2015 estimates of
trend growth extracted using iFF for all 153 countries, are contained in Table 7 (cf.
Appendix), which constitutes the main output of this paper.
For instance, we ﬁnd that China has been growing at 6.81% p.a. since 2008 (last
trend shift in 2007). 2007 was a trend down-shift, hence a further down-shift would be
identiﬁed as a ≤ 5.81% p.a. average growth rate over the next ≥ 5 years, whereas an
up-shift would be a ≥ 9.81% p.a. average growth rate over the same period. In 2016,
the conditional probabilities of trend down and up-shifts are 17.3% and 1% respectively.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the trend extraction
methodology (iFF) and examples of what it identiﬁes in practice. In Section 3, we
establish some stylized facts about trend growth durations and shifts in developing
versus developed countries. Section 4 builds our predictive model by ﬁrst explaining
the econometric framework, then undertaking an exploratory analysis of the potential
determinants of trend growth durations and shifts.
62. Extracting Trend Growth
Trend growth is unobserved. The assumptions that we impose in order to extract
the trend component from growth time series should reﬂect the way in which we think
about the growth process and therefore deﬁne what trend growth is. For instance,
the well-known Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter [26] extracts trend growth by taking a weighted
moving average of the growth time series and therefore assumes that trend growth
evolves continuously over time. In this paper, we embrace the basic deﬁnition of trend
growth as a medium/long term average growth rate and therefore think about the trend
as evolving discretely. This section develops a simple iterative algorithm that builds
on the “Fit and Filter” (FF) approach proposed in KPRS [29] and extracts trend
growth by ﬁrst identifying economically signiﬁcant trend shift dates. We start with a
precise deﬁnition of trend growth in our context, then motivate and describe the trend
extraction method, and ﬁnally discuss several examples of what it gives in practice.
2.1. Deﬁning trend growth. We conceptualize economic growth {g(t)}t∈Z as a pro-
cess that vibrates around a medium/long term average growth rate - the trend {τ(t)}t∈Z
:
(2.1) g(t) = τ(t) + c(t)
where the cycle c(t) is a zero-mean transitory ﬂuctuation.
At time t, the trend can shift up:
Δτ(t) ≡ τ(t+ 1)− τ(t) > 0
or down:
Δτ(t) < 0
making growth vibrate around a new higher or lower level. Note that Δτ(t) is a forward
diﬀerence; the trend shift happens in t, but the country starts growing at the new trend
growth rate only from period t+ 1.
Suppose that the country is observed for T periods of time over which it experiences
m ≥ 0 trend shifts. As a convention, we set T0 = 0 and Tm+1 = T .1
Let T = {T1, ..., Tm} be the set of shift dates. We want to extract trend growth as
a sequence of medium/long term averages:






g(s) for t ∈ Tj−1 + 1, ..., Tj, j = 1, ...,m+ 1
where Dj = Tj − Tj−1 is the jth trend growth duration - number of years for which the
country grows at the trend growth rate at which it started growing in period Tj−1 + 1.
To agree with our basic deﬁnition of trend growth as a medium/long term average
growth rate that captures some fundamental developments in a country’s growth process
which go beyond business cycle ﬂuctuations, we want to ensure that:
(1) The averages are taken over a medium/long term, i.e for all j = 1, ...,m+ 1:
Dj ≥ δ
where δ is the minimum trend growth duration - the least number of periods
over which the average has to be taken.
(2) Trend shifts are economically signiﬁcant, i.e. for any t ∈ T :
|Δτ(t)| ≥ F
where F is a threshold that we impose. Intuitively, trend shifts have to be large
enough, since they should signal some new fundamental developments in the
country’s growth process.
The choice of both the minimum trend growth duration δ and the threshold(s) F should
depend on the type of trend growth movements that we are interested in.
In this paper, we work with annual growth data and think about trend growth as a
medium/long term average growth rate, therefore setting δ = 5. If our interest were
only in long term growth, we could set, δ = 10 therefore taking averages over at least
decade long intervals.
Similarly, if we believe that an at least 2 percentage points change in a medium/long
term average growth rate is economically signiﬁcant, we can set F = 2. If our sole
interest were in dramatic trend shifts, we could raise F to 5.
The thresholds could also be non-linear. In this paper, we employ the ﬁlter proposed
in KPRS [29], which sets F = 2 for a ﬁrst shift, then distinguishes between a trend shift
in the same direction (e.g. up-shift after up-shift) with F = 1, and a trend shift in the
opposite direction (e.g. down-shift after up-shift) with F = 3. The idea is that once the
trend has already shifted up (down), shifting further up (down) by even 1 percentage
point is already economically signiﬁcant. At the same time, in order to avoid confusing
trend shifts and business cycles, the medium/long term average would have to change
by at least 3 percentage points if shifting in the opposite direction.
8There is no single best answer and, as discussed below, no consensus in the academic
literature on what the “right” parameters should be. The framework in this paper is
therefore designed speciﬁcally to be very ﬂexible and general.
In any case, once we have decided on δ and F , all we need to extract trend growth
according to eq.2.3 is to identify the trend shift dates T .
2.2. Identifying trend shift dates.
2.2.1. The statistical and ﬁlter approaches. Although the ultimate purpose is usually
diﬀerent from extracting trend growth per se, the timing of shifts/breaks in growth time
series has been an important preoccupation in many papers. In order to investigate
the factors that initiate and halt growth accelerations (Hausmann et al. [23], Berg
et al. [12]), growth collapses (Hausmann et al. [24]) or both (Jones and Olken [28],
Kerekes [30]), researchers always start by proposing a way of identifying in historical
growth data the episodes that are relevant to their study. Since these episodes start
with a signiﬁcant and sustained acceleration/collapse in the average growth rate, their
identiﬁcation relies of the timing of the dates at which such shifts happen.
This empirical growth literature can be broadly classiﬁed into two main streams: the
papers that use the statistical approach based on the Bai-Perron (BP) methodology
[8, 9], and those that employ “ﬁlters” - subjectively deﬁned rules that vary from paper
to paper.
Given a time series of annual growth rates, the statistical approach (sometimes called
the BP methodology) ﬁrst identiﬁes the sets of break dates that produce the best ﬁt
for a given number of breaks, from one up to a maximum. The researcher can impose
this maximum number directly and/or specify a minimum number of years between
consecutive breaks (akin to the minimum trend growth duration in our case) so that
the maximum number of breaks gets determined indirectly by the length of the time
series. As mentioned above, there is no consensus on what these numbers should be
- Jones & Olken [28] assume a minimum of 5 years between breaks, Berg et al. [12]
report results for both 5 and 8, Kerekes [30] opts for 10. In any case, the statistical
method then proceeds sequentially: starting from the null hypothesis of no breaks in the
time series, it tests whether allowing for additional break(s) signiﬁcantly improves the
goodness of ﬁt.2 Again, there is no complete agreement on which statistical tests should
be employed to gauge this signiﬁcance - for instance, all previous references [28, 30, 12]
employ diﬀerent tests. This sequential testing continues until we can no longer reject
2The standard practice is to allow for one additional break only. However, sometimes the alternative
hypothesis is “one or more” as in Berg et al.[12], i.e. a “double maximum” test, cf. discussion in
Kerekes [30].
9the hypothesis of m ≥ 0 breaks against the alternative of (one) more break(s) or until
reaching the maximum number of breaks allowed/possible.
Whatever the testing procedure, the fundamental problem with the purely statisti-
cal approach is that it sometimes identiﬁes economically insigniﬁcant changes in long
term growth averages as statistically signiﬁcant (“false positives”), while omitting some
economically signiﬁcant changes because of statistical insigniﬁcance (“true negatives”).
For instance, a 2 percentage points change in the medium/long term average growth
rate may be identiﬁed as statistically signiﬁcant in a country where the underlying
growth process has low volatility so that even small changes seem to be big when viewed
through the “statistical” lens. At the same time, a 4 percentage points change can be
dismissed in another country where the growth process is inherently more unstable so
that important changes appear as “random” from a statistical perspective.
To understand the practical consequences of using the BP methodology for our pur-
pose (extracting trend growth), we implemented a statistical approach based on a stan-
dard F -test (Zeileis et al. [44, 43]) and found a statistically signiﬁcant break for Canada
in 1979 with its average real GDP p.c. growth rate changing from 2.7% per annum be-
tween 1951 and 1979 to 1.3% p.a. for the 1980-2015 period. We also found only one
break for China, in 1977, i.e. we completely missed seven shifts in the Chinese trend
growth rate, illustrated in Figure 2.3, which are not only economically large (over 3%
points changes each) but, as discussed below, also coincide with major events in the
Chinese economic history.
This “low power” issue inherent in the statistical methodology is widely recognized
in the literature, e.g. Bai and Perron [10] conﬁrm the presence of “true negatives”
through Monte Carlo simulations. Jones and Olken [28] explicitly recognize that the
sets of break dates they identify are “conservative”, while Berg et al. [12] complement
the statistical tests with economic criteria to go from statistical breaks to economically
meaningful growth spells by removing some irrelevant breaks.
The “ﬁlter” approach avoids this “low power” issue by looking speciﬁcally for eco-
nomically meaningful changes in the medium/long term growth rate, found by sys-
tematically applying a set of researcher-deﬁned rules to growth data. For instance,
Hausmann et al. [23] identify growth accelerations as “increases in per-capita growth
of 2 percentage points or more, [...] sustained for at least eight years and [such that]
the post acceleration growth rate [is] at least 3.5 percent per year.” Another example
is Hausmann et al. [24], who deﬁne growth collapses as “intervals that start with a
contraction of output per worker and end when the value immediately preceding the
decline is attained again”. Clearly, the main disadvantage of the ﬁlter approach is
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the lack of a common framework, which identiﬁes up and down-shifts in a consistent
manner.
2.2.2. The original Fit & Filter (FF). A recent paper by Kar, Pritchett, Raihan and
Sen [29] summarizes the shortcomings of both approaches and proposes to combine
them in order to overcome their limitations while preserving their advantages. The
authors call the result “Fit & Filter” (FF) because the approach “involves the best
ﬁt of the BP method to the data in the ﬁrst stage, and the application of a ﬁlter to
the breaks identiﬁed in the ﬁrst stage in the second stage.” Hence, FF overcomes the
“low power” of the statistical approach by not using its second step (the statistical
tests), while providing a uniﬁed way of identifying both economically meaningful up
and down-shifts.
Another important advantage of the original FF is that, unlike the standard statistical
and ﬁlter approaches, it takes into account the nature of the previous shift: a ﬁrst
candidate break is classiﬁed as “genuine” if the average growth rate before and after the
break changes by at least 2% points. For any subsequent break, the ﬁlter distinguishes
between a break in the same direction (e.g. acceleration after acceleration), in which
case a 1% point change is enough for signiﬁcance, and a break in the opposite direction
(e.g. deceleration after acceleration) where the shift has to be at least 3% points large
to be qualiﬁed as genuine.
Recognizing this nonlinearity in growth dynamics is important because of the rever-
sion to the mean phenomenon (Easterly et al. [15], Pritchett & Summers [34]) - the idea
that it is much easier for countries that have experienced a trend up-shift in the past,
to then experience a trend down-shift, i.e. to revert back to the world average growth
rate, rather than experience yet another up-shift. Hence a further acceleration in their
trend growth rate of even as little as a 1% point is already a substantial achievement.
A similar argument would hold for down-shifts.
To help the reader understand how the FF approach works in practice, here is a
concrete example from the original paper [29]:
In the case of Brazil, the ﬁrst step identiﬁes four candidate break years:
1967, 1980, 1992 and 2002. In 1967, growth accelerated from 3.7% (for
1950–1967) to 6.3% (for 1967–1980). Since this is the ﬁrst potential break
and is above the 2% threshold, we conclude that it as a genuine break. In
1980, growth decelerates from 6.35% to -1.1% (for 1980–1992), a deceler-
ation of 7.4% and easily passes the “deceleration following acceleration”
threshold of 3%. In 1992, growth accelerates from -1.1% to 1.4%, a change
of 2.5%. However, as this is an acceleration following a deceleration, it
would have to be above 3% in order to pass the ﬁlter and hence we do not
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include 1992 as a “genuine” growth break. In 2002, growth accelerated
again, this time to 2.5% and since this was an acceleration following a
previous candidate acceleration it only had to pass the 1% threshold.
KPRS [29] document that FF achieves a substantial improvement over the statistical
method in identifying a larger number of “true negatives”, especially in developing
countries where the volatility of growth is itself a consequence of a trend growth process
with many shifts, and in omitting the “false positives” in developed countries with
smooth trend growth paths. Furthermore, the breaks identiﬁed often seem to coincide
with major events in the economic history of the respective countries. Hence, it seems
that FF is fully appropriate as a method of extracting trend growth as a sequence of
medium/long term averages taken over periods that are historically meaningful, and
such that shifts in trend growth are economically signiﬁcant.
Despite this, the original FF has two issues which became apparent as we tried to
generalize it and employ for our purpose. Both arise because of the way in which FF
uses the ﬁrst step of the BP methodology, i.e. the “Fit” part. As explained above, this
ﬁrst step simply ﬁnds the optimal location of a given number of breaks (from one up
to a maximum allowed/possible) in a given time series by minimizing the residual sum
of squares (best ﬁt). The statistical approach then uses these sets of optimal dates and
their associated residual sums of squares sequentially in the second step (the statistical
tests). By contrast, there is no sequential testing in the FF: it only uses the optimal
set of dates identiﬁed for the maximum allowed and hence the choice of this maximum
matters a lot.
The authors assume 8 years between breaks and simply “postulate that a country
with: (i) Forty years of data, can have a maximum of two breaks. (ii) More than 40
years and up to 55 years, can have a maximum of three breaks. (iii) More than 55
years, can have a maximum of four breaks.” However, with ﬁve more years of data and
assuming a minimum of 5 years between breaks instead of 8, what maximum number
should we postulate to apply the ﬁlter?3
Retaking the example of Brazil. Postulating seven gives 1956, 1962, 1967, 1973, 1980,
1987, and 1992 as potential breakpoints, all of which pass the ﬁlter. Choosing eight
as the maximum yields 1956, 1962, 1967, 1973, 1980, 1992, 2003, 2010. However, now
1992 and 2010 miss the ﬁlter thresholds.
This example illustrates the two crucial issues with the original FF:
3We use the Penn World Table version 9.0 (Feenstra et al. [16]) extended to 2015 with IMF World
Economic outlook data, while KPRS use PWT version 7.1 that stops in 2010. Also note that we use
real GDP p.c. data while KPRS employ GDP p.c. in Purchasing Power Parity.
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(1) the choice of the maximum matters for whether we identify a break date as
genuine or not: 1992 is a genuine break point if we assume a maximum of seven
break dates, but becomes fake if we raise this maximum to eight;
(2) the ﬁnal set of dates identiﬁed as genuine by FF is not necessarily optimal: if
FF identiﬁes six out of eight breaks as genuine, the locations of the six genuine
breaks are not necessarily such that the residual sum of squares is minimized
(best ﬁt) over all possible sets of six break dates since they were selected as
part of the eight-dates set that gives the best ﬁt among all sets of eight dates.
These are two diﬀerent optimization problems and the optimal set of m break
dates is not necessarily a subset of the optimal set of m + 1 break dates (cf.
Bai and Perron [9] for the dynamic programming algorithm used to solve these
problems). This issue creates a disadvantage for the FF as compared to the
statistical/BP methodology where the ﬁnal set of break points identiﬁed is al-
ways optimal since only optimal sets are used in the sequential testing and if
a set is rejected, all the dates within this set are rejected and the non-rejected
alternative is just another set of optimally located dates.
2.2.3. The iterative Fit & Filter (iFF). In order to make FF robust to these issues,
we propose an iterative algorithm that builds on the original FF and that we therefore
call the “iterative Fit & Filter” (iFF). iFF can be easily programmed in any standard
statistical software package by following the steps described in the insert on the next
page. The computer code that implements it in R is available on request.
The researcher no longer has to postulate any maximum number of breaks. The only
choice parameters are the minimum trend growth duration and the ﬁlter, which, as we
discussed in section 2.1, should depend on how trend growth is deﬁned for the purpose
of the research question.
Given the speciﬁed minimum duration δ, Step 1 simply determines the maximum
possible number of breaks from the length T of the time series and calls it m1. We then
search for the set of m1 dates that minimizes the residual sum of squares (Step 2) and
such that the minimum number of years between any two trend shifts is δ, i.e. we take
averages over at least δ years.
We then use the identiﬁed candidate shift dates to compute the candidate trend
growth process and the set of candidate trend shifts (Step 3). We check whether or
not all trend shift dates pass the ﬁlter threshold(s).
If yes (Step 4.1), we are done: we have found the trend process that satisﬁes our
deﬁnition of trend growth - conditions (1) and (2) in section 2.1. The optimal trend shift
dates delimitate the periods over which the averages have to be taken when extracting
the trend from growth time series.
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Algorithm 1 Iterative Fit & Filter (iFF)
Notation: Let x denote the largest integer that does not exceed x.














g(s) for t ∈ Tj−1 + 1, ..., Tj, j = 1, ...,m+ 1
and Dj = Tj − Tj−1 is the jth trend growth duration - number of years for which the
country grows at the trend growth rate at which it started growing in period Tj−1+1.
Step 1: Determine the maximum possible number of trend shifts m1. Given the
length of the time series T and the minimum trend growth duration δ, the growth
time series can be divided into at most T/δ segments, hence:
m1 = T/δ − 1





over all possible sets ofm1 trend shift dates T = {T1, ..., Tm1} such that Tj−Tj−1 ≥ δ
for all j = 1, ...,m1 + 1. In practice, this set can be found by using the dynamic
programming algorithm described in Bai and Perron [9].
Step 3: Use the optimal trend shift dates Tˆ and eq.2.3 to compute the trend
{τ(t)}Tt=1 and the set of trend shifts: {Δτ(t)}t∈Tˆ .
Step 4.1: If all trend shifts satisfy the threshold(s) of the ﬁlter, i.e. for all t ∈ Tˆ .
|Δτ(t)| ≥ F
we have found an optimally placed set of trend shift dates such that all resulting
trend shifts are economically signiﬁcant. {τ(t)}Tt=1 computed in Step 3 is the trend.
Step 4.2: While at least one of the trend shifts is not economically signiﬁcant, we
re-iterate Steps 2 and 3 with:
mk+1 = mk − 1
instead of m1 until either we end in Step 4.1 with an optimally placed and econom-
ically signiﬁcant set of mk trend shifts Tˆ , or mk+1 = 0 and we conclude that there
are no trend shifts and simply compute the trend as the average growth rate over the
T periods.
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If not (Step 4.2), there is at least one trend shift that is not economically signiﬁcant.
To see why we need to re-iterate steps 2 and 3 in this case, suppose that 4 out of 5 trend
shifts satisfy the threshold(s). The only thing that we can conclude at this point is that
there is no way of segmenting our growth time series with 5 trend shifts that are both
optimally placed and economically signiﬁcant. The four trend shifts that happen to be
economically signiﬁcant are not necessarily optimally placed because their location in
step 2 was determined by minimizing the residual sum of squares over all possible sets
of ﬁve trend shift dates. To determine the optimal location of four trend shift dates, we
would need to minimize the residual sum of squares over all possible sets of four trend
shift dates, i.e. re-do step 2 with m2 = 4.
We re-iterate our search as long as a trend process with all trend shifts satisfying
the economic ﬁlter is not found. Intuitively, in each iteration k, we ask the following
question: is it possible to divide our growth time series so that mk trend shifts are
placed optimally (Step 2) and are economically signiﬁcant (Steps 3 & 4)? If no trend
shift dates are identifed as economically signiﬁcant, we simply conclude that the country
experiences no trend shifts in the sample over which we observe it, and therefore our
best guess of its trend growth rate over this sample is the full sample growth average.
2.3. iFF in practice: trend growth & economic history. We now examine some
real world examples of what iFF applied to growth time series data yields. Annual real
GDP p.c. growth rates are constructed using the Penn World Table (PWT) version
9.0 (Feenstra et al. [16]) and extended to 2015 with the IMF World Economic Outlook
(WEO) data. Our sample contains twenty developed countries and we use developing
when referring to any country that is not developed (i.e. our developing countries
include newly industrialized countries, emerging markets, frontier markets, and least
developed countries).4
Table 7 in the Appendix summarizes the most recent (as of 2015) trend growth rate
and the last trend shift date and magnitude for all 153 countries in our sample, as well
as the hazards (conditional probabilities) of trend up and down-shifts which are the
focus of the next section. Figures 2.1 to 2.3 illustrate the complete trend growth paths
(red) for the USA, France, and China.
4PWT version 9.0 provides data for 182 countries, up to and including 2014. Data goes back to 1950 for
some countries. The database is freely accessible at http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-
9.0 and fully described in Feenstra et al. [16]. To construct our real GDP p.c. time series, we divide
rgdpna (Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices (in mil. 2011US$)) by pop (Population (in mil-
lions)). We remove 28 countries with population less than 600,000 in 2014 and the State of Palestine
because it is absent from major datasets like the IMF WEO and the World Bank World Development
Indicators (WDI) that we employ below. The set of developed countries includes: Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
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Figure 2.1 Trend growth in the United States (1951-2015)
Notes: Trend growth (red) extracted from annual real GDP p.c. growth data (blue) using iFF.
Figure 2.2 Trend growth in France (1951-2015)
Notes: Trend growth (red) extracted from annual real GDP p.c. growth data (blue) using iFF.
Between 1951 and 2015, trend growth in the USA, as well as Australia, Canada,
Sweden and the UK, can be summarized by a single rate of around 2% p.a. At the
same time, other developed countries like France, Germany, Italy, Spain etc., and, in
particular, many developing economies have experienced more interesting trend growth
dynamics that often coincide with important country-speciﬁc historical and political
developments.
For instance, in France (ﬁgure 2.2), 1974/75 marks the end of a thirty years period
known as “The Glorious Thirty” (“Les Trente Glorieuses”, cf. Fourastie´ [18] who coined
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the term or Lejeune [31] for a more recent reassessment of the period). Damaged by
the two World Wars, France experienced a period of “catch up” growth driven by
the reconstruction and the industrialization of the country, rising productivity and
consumption levels. However, as this model of growth reached its limits, the country,
hit by the 1973 oil shock, entered a period of stagﬂation, rising unemployment, and
slower productivity growth. Trend growth per capita dropped from 4.2% p.a. to 1.7%
p.a.
In France, as in Finland, Austria, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Norway and Spain
(cf. Table 7), 2007/2008 appears as a down-shift in trend growth, while in other de-
veloped economies it is “only” a very large negative ﬂuctuation around a per-existing
trend. This may be because this pre-existing trend growth rate was already very low,
e.g. Portugal has been growing at close to 0% since 2001, or because the country recov-
ers from the Great Recession relatively quickly and is not as harshly hit by the 2011/12
recession, e.g. Germany.
Note that as time passes and iFF is ﬁt on new enlarged samples, the trend shift
dates (especially the latest ones) may be re-assessed. Indeed, with hindsight it will
become more obvious whether or not 2007 was a watershed in the economic history of
France. As of 2015/16, it seems that the country experienced a downward sustained
shift in 2007 not only because of the global ﬁnancial crisis - although this has certainly
been an important catalyst. The profound need for structural reforms in France and
a rising level of domestic discontent have rendered the country vulnerable to external
shocks. France needs to “change [its] model”, to paraphrase the title of a recent book
by Aghion, Cette and Cohen [2] in which the authors discuss a set of reforms that could
help France become an innovation-driven economy and experience an up-shift from its
current 0% trend growth rate.
Another interesting example is China.
After a period of restoration from WWII (1949-1952), the Communist Party of China
(CPC), under the leadership of Mao Zedong, launched the ﬁrst ﬁve-year plan in 1953.
Modeled after the Soviet example and aided by Soviet planners and engineers, the CPC
re-organized industries into cooperatives and farmers into socialized collective units.
The main goal of the plan was to achieve high economic growth with a particular focus
on developing heavy industries (steel, concrete, iron, machinery, ...). Investment in
the industrial sector was ﬁnanced by extracting surpluses from agriculture where prices
were set artiﬁcially low. Although, the economy did expand at a trend growth rate of
5.5% p.a., an important sectoral imbalance emerged, and in 1958, the CPC decided to
abandon the Soviet model and instead to take a “great leap forward” in the production
of all sectors simultaneously.
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Figure 2.3 Trend growth in China (1951-2015)
Notes: Trend growth (red) extracted from annual real GDP p.c. growth data (blue) using iFF.
Collectivization was pushed further with the prohibition of private plots and the es-
tablishment of communes. Decision-making and planning were decentralized. The con-
struction of Soviet-like large and capital-intensive plants was pursued but at a slower
tempo and now complemented with locally built and run, small-scale, low-technology
projects. These “backyard” projects yielded substandard products while diverting an
important proportion of farm labour, and together with the ineﬃciency of the com-
munes, the withdrawal of the Soviet ﬁnancial and technical support, and several natural
disasters, resulted in what is known as the “Great Famine” - a substantial disruption
of China’s agriculture which starved to death at least 15 million people (unoﬃcial es-
timates range higher, between 20 and 30 million) between 1959 and 1962.
Indeed, although the CPC started to repel the “Great Leap Forward” program al-
ready in 1960 with private plots being returned to the farmers, the communal system
being reduced, unemployed workers and investment being transferred from industry to
agriculture; it is only in 1963 that the agricultural situation had suﬃciently improved
and some resources started being redirected back to the industrial sector.
Another consequence of the disruption produced by the “Great Leap Forward” was
the appearance of a group of politicians who recognized that China needed to switch
to a model of development where material incentives play a greater role, and against
whom Mao Zedong initiated the Cultural Revolution in early 1966. Political instability
continued until Mao’s death in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping’s arrival to power in 1977.
Xiaoping announced a modernization program which pushed the country onto a new
development path of “reform and opening up” (“Gaige Kaifang”) from 1978 onwards.
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Indeed, 1978 is very often considered as a watershed in the economic history of modern
China, “the year when China started economic reform” (Zhu [45]). The goal was not
to eliminate state planning and control, but to increase the role of material incentives
by introducing market mechanisms into the system. The program aimed at expand-
ing foreign trade (by encouraging exports, easing negotiations and cooperation with
foreign ﬁrms and legalizing trading and credit arrangements) and eliminating existing
deﬁciencies and distortions (e.g. between light and heavy industries).
Zhu [45], who implements a growth accounting exercise to decompose the sources
of Chinese growth before and since 1978, shows that in the before period, all growth
was due to physical and human capital accumulation, ﬁnanced by massive government
investment and a rise in education levels. On the contrary, since 1978, a rise in pro-
ductivity became the main driver of growth.
Productivity in agriculture was stimulated through a substantial rise in oﬃcial agri-
culture prices and the creation of the “household responsibility system” in 1979. Under
the latter, farmers had to sell a certain amount of grains at oﬃcial prices to the gov-
ernment, but could then transact anything beyond the quota at market prices and for
their own enrichment.
The results were considerable: ﬁg. 2.3 shows that the economy expanded at 6.6% p.a.
and per capita. Trade increased from 8.5% of GDP in 1977 to 23% in 1985. All sectors
were expanding except for manufacturing, whose value added as a percentage of GDP
even fell from 39.3% in 1977 to 34% in 1985, because heavy industry was purposefully
restrained.5
The reforms were introduced gradually, ﬁrst in a few localities, then, if successful,
nationally, and completed by 1984 when most households were under the responsibility
system, and most communes had been dissolved. The eﬃciency gains “from workers
using the same technology with a much more rewarding set of incentives, were largely
exhausted” by 1984 (Zhu [45]), and a period of relative stagnation began with trend
growth shifting down to 2.2% p.a. in 1985.
A new liberalization wave emerged around 1990 with trend growth shifting up to 8.3%
p.a. Government interventions were further reduced, markets for agricultural inputs
and outputs further liberalized and incentives for the adoption of new technologies
set in place. The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges opened in 1990 and 1991
respectively. The “open door” policy was introduced in 1992 with the aim of creating a
legal basis for Chinese-foreign joint ventures. Special economic zones were introduced
to facilitate the inﬂux of foreign investment.
5Figures quoted in this passage are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators.
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Although China was less aﬀected by the Asian Financial crisis than other economies,
e.g. Indonesia and Thailand which experienced trend down-shifts to negative growth
rates in 1996, the Chinese trend growth rate did slow down to 4.4% p.a. in 1995.
Indeed, foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP fell from 6% in 1994 to 3.2%
in 2000 and monetary conditions were tightened with the annual broad money growth
rate falling from 31.5% in 1994 to 12.3% in 2000.
The last up-shift in China’s trend growth rate to 10% p.a. in 2001 coincides not
only with a global economic recovery but also China’s entry into the World Trade
Organization, which “introduced international economic laws [into the country] and
ushered a period of rapid regulatory reform by creating agencies such as the China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) to govern increasingly globally integrated
markets” (Yueh [42]).
Recently, there has been a lot of debate in the press and the academic literature
(e.g. Pritchett & Summers [34]) about whether or not the Chinese economy is slowing
down. Our analysis indicates that China, hit by several natural disasters (the 2008
Chinese winter storms and ﬂoods in the South, the Sichuan earthquake) and the Global
Recession (e.g. Chinese trade fell from 64.8% of GDP in 2006 to 41.2% in 2015), has
already experienced a down-shift in trend growth in 2007 and is currently growing at
6.8% p.a.
Whether a further slowdown will happen in the future is an open question and we
shall try to contribute to the ongoing debate below, in section 4.3.
These examples suggest that iFF inherits from the original FF the ability to identify
in a systematic way important episodes in the economic history of a country and could
therefore be a useful tool for economic historians, many of whom still often rely on
their judgment or arbitrary time periods when presenting and interpreting summary
statistics. For instance, to decompose the 1978-2007 period into subperiods, Zhu [45]
simply takes three ten years long periods: 1978-1988, 1988-1998, and 1998-2007, while
our analysis suggests a rather diﬀerent decomposition of the 1978-2007 period into eco-
nomically and historically meaningful subperiods. In future work, iFF could therefore
be employed to undertake a much more thorough economic history analysis for a larger
number of countries.
3. Trend Growth Durations & Shifts: Stylized Facts
Although the previous examples illustrate the great variety of trend growth dynamics
within and between countries, it is also important to try to establish some stylized facts
about the trend growth processes identiﬁed. In this section, we look at the temporal
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Figure 3.1 Temporal distribution of trend shifts
Note: Percentages of countries experiencing up and down-shifts in trend growth p.a.
and spatial distributions of trend growth shifts, and the distribution of trend growth
durations in developed versus developing countries.
3.1. Trend growth shifts.
3.1.1. Temporal distribution. Although we have growth data for 153 diﬀerent countries,
these countries are observed over diﬀerent periods of time between 1950 and 2015, so
that the eﬀective number of countries in our sample varies over time.6
Hence, the number of trend shifts happening in a given year is not directly comparable
over time. Instead, in order to investigate the temporal distribution of trend shifts,
Figure 3.1 shows the percentage of countries experiencing trend up and down-shifts
each year.
The earliest and latest shifts happen respectively in 1955 and 2010 since we assume
a minimum trend growth duration of 5 years. The alternation between red bars dom-
inating green ones and vice versa suggests that up and down-shifts do not coincide.
Indeed, the correlation between the percentages of up and down-shifts each year is
6For instance, data for all post-Soviet nations only starts in 1990 (growth data from 1991). These
countries have so far been almost always excluded from similar studies on the grounds of not suﬃciently
long time series - e.g. Hausmann et al. [23] require at least 20 data points, Pritchett & Summers [34]
exclude all countries with “less than 25 years of data”. We believe it is important to integrate this
group of countries into our study, not only because we now do have 25 years of growth data for them,
but also because their post-Soviet experiences certainly contain a lot of valuable information for helping
us understand what aﬀects trend growth durations & shifts.
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-0.12; not very big but negative, possibly indicating the presence of systemic trend
growth spillovers that could be investigated in more details in future work.
Earlier studies (e.g. Ben-David & Papell [11]) have found that for developed countries
most up-shifts take place in the 1950s and the 1960s during the postwar reconstruction
period, which coincides with a signiﬁcant liberalization of trade and the creation of
institutions such as Bretton-Woods and GATT, while most down-shifts take place in
the early 1970s, with the ﬁrst oil price shock in 1973 acting as an important catalyst.
Our research conﬁrms and extends these previous ﬁndings. All twenty developed
countries are observed between 1950 and 2015 and, overall, experience 11 up-shifts and
31 down-shifts. Most up-shifts (8 out of 11) happen during the 1950s and 1960s, and
35% of all down-shifts take place in the 1970s. However, a novel ﬁnding is that 32%
of all down-shifts happen in the 2000s highlighting the magnitude of the impact of the
Great Recession in the developed world.
Many Latin American countries experience trend down-shifts in the late 1970s/early
1980s, e.g. Venezuela in 1977, Argentina and Brazil in 1980, Mexico and Chile in 1981
(cf. Diaz-Alejandro [14] for a thorough analysis of the Latin American debt crisis).
Most down-shifts of the late 1990s are related to the Asian Financial crisis: Thailand
and Indonesia in 1996, Malaysia and Singapore in 1997...
The 15% of up-shifts in 1995 mostly come from countries that were part of the
Soviet Bloc - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzs-
tan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Macedonia
... which started to recover from the disruptions in their economies produced by the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Another important wave of up-shifts happens in
the early 2000s. Some are further up-shifts in emerging eastern Europe (Tajikistan &
Ukraine in 2001, Armenia in 2000...), others are recoveries from the Asian crisis (Indone-
sia and Thailand 2001). Many commodity exporters experience up-shifts in 2002/2003
(Argentina, Peru, and Colombia in 2002, Bolivia and Venezuela in 2003) as a recovery
from a period of historically low commodity prices between 1998 and 2002 which led to
signiﬁcant falls in tax revenues and important economic disruptions in these countries
(cf. Tenreyro [40] for a retrospective analysis of the 2001-2002 Argentine crisis and
Spatafora and Samake [39] for an empirical investigation of how commodity prices and
ﬁscal outcomes are related).
The late 2000s, especially 2007/2008, stand out as the most important years of trend
growth down-shifts in modern history. Of course, we should not forget that this is close
to the end of the sample and results could change later on, with hindsight. However,
this ﬁnding seems plausible given the magnitude of the growth disruptions provoked by
the Great Recession in both developed and developing countries.
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Figure 3.2 Spatial distribution of trend growth shifts
Up-shifts per annum
Down-shifts per annum
Note: Countries not in sample are in white.
3.1.2. Spatial distribution. Each country in our sample has between 25 and 65 years of
growth data. Hence, similarly to the number of trend shifts per annum, the numbers of
trend shifts per country are not directly comparable. Instead, to investigate the spatial
distribution of trend up and down-shifts, Figure 3.2 illustrates the respective numbers
of shifts per annum.
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Several interesting observations emerge. First of all, developing countries are more
prone to both up and down-shifts than developed ones. This ﬁnding is not new. In
his seminal contribution, which spurred researchers to pay much more attention to
within country growth dynamics, Pritchett [33] already argued that “a single time trend
does not adequately characterize the evolution of GDP per capita in most developing
countries”.
The correlation between the numbers of up and down-shifts p.a. is 0.33, suggesting
that for some countries trend growth is unstable in both directions, and that, at least
to some extent, all countries are capable of both up and down-shifts. In particular,
the ﬁgures buttress the ﬁndings of Frances, Paap and van Dijk [19] who examine the
question of whether Africa is less capable of growth than Latin America or Asia. They
implement a data-based classiﬁcation of countries into clusters and ﬁnd that one third
of African countries are not assigned to the low growth cluster. Hence, it is wrong to
aggregate and simply label Africa as the “lost continent”. Figure 3.2 indeed shows that
although some African countries do exhibit very large numbers of down-shifts p.a., this
is not the case for all the continent. Moreover, many African countries also exhibit
a signiﬁcant number of up-shifts and are comparable to Latin American and Asian
countries in terms of numbers of up and down-shifts. If anything, it seems that there
is more heterogeneity in both up and down-shifts p.a. in Africa than on any other
continent.
Middle East countries appear as very prone to down-shifts because of the numerous
conﬂicts that have taken place in these countries over the past half century.
One potential caveat to bear in mind when interpreting our ﬁndings, is that some
of our up-shifts are from negative growth to less negative growth, while some down-
shifts are from positive to less positive growth. In this simple approach, we also do not
distinguish between shifts of diﬀerent magnitudes. Figure 3.4 therefore complements
the analysis by showing the spatial distribution of the median absolute trend shift
magnitude for each country in our sample. Once again, it seems that overall developing
nations experience much larger swings in their trend growth paths in both directions.
The median absolute trend shift in a developing country is 5.45% points against a mere
2.3% pts. for developed economies.
Note that the relatively large trend shift magnitudes of many post-Soviet nations
may be directly due to the fact that we have growth data for them only since 1991,
a period that coincides with a particularly turbulent part of their histories after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Their large up-shift intensities exhibited in Figure 3.2 are
also, at least to some extent, the result of recovering from a period of very negative
growth rates in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s.
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Figure 3.4 Spatial distribution of trend shift magnitudes
Median absolute trend shift magnitude
Note: Countries not in sample are in white.
3.2. Trend growth durations. In practice, the much greater instability of trend
growth in developing countries documented above implies that the number of years
over which it makes economic and historical sense to take medium/long term averages
of growth rates - trend growth durations - in these countries are shorter.
To make this more precise, let’s think of the trend growth duration - number of years
between two consecutive trend growth shifts - as a discrete random variable that takes
values in {δ, δ + 1, δ + 2, ...}.
Our data consists of trend growth episodes, each starting in Tj−1 + 1 (the year after
the last trend growth shift or the beginning of the sample if Tj−1 = 0, where 0 is the
year when GDP p.c. data is ﬁrst observed for the country so that growth rates are
computed from year 1) and ending in Tj with trend growth shifting either up or down,
or with the end of the sample if Tj = T . Hence, each trend growth episode has a certain
duration Dj = Tj −Tj−1. When Tj = T , the duration is censored since we do not know
when the current trend growth episodes will end. The only thing we know is that they
have already lasted for D˜m = T − Tm−1 years, m being the number of trend growth
shifts.
Treating our data as a random sample collected from the population of trend growth
episodes, the left panel of Figure 3.5 compares the probabilities that an developing (red)
versus a developed (blue) country has a trend growth duration of at least d years:
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Figure 3.5 Trend growth survivor functions
Notes: Developing countries trend growth survivor functions estimation based on 671 trend growth
episodes and 629 trend growth shifts. For developed countries the respective numbers are 62 and 42.




In survival/duration analysis, S(d) is known as the survivor function.7
The comparison is stark: while the probability of having 10 years or more between
two consecutive trend shifts in a developed country is 0.72, in a developing country it is
as low as 0.31. In developed countries, half of the trend growth episodes last for at least
18 years (S(18) = 0.5), while in developing countries this number is around 7 years.
Also, note that 20% of all trend growth episodes from developed countries in our
sample are censored at 66 because a number of developed countries experience no trend
shifts between 1950 and 2015, i.e. we only know that these countries have been growing
at the same constant trend growth rate for at least 66 years over which we observe
them.
Since we have assumed δ = 5, the probability of all trend growth durations lasting
at least 5 years is one: Pr(D ≥ 5) = 1.





7Many great reference on discrete time survival analysis exist, for instance, Allison [6], Rodriguez [35],
or Jenkins [27].
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where α(d) is the discrete-time hazard - the conditional probability that a trend growth
shift happens exactly d years after the last one, conditional on the current trend growth
episode having already lasted d years:
(3.2) α(d) = Pr(Tj = Tj−1 + d|Dj ≥ d) = Pr(Dj = d)
S(d)
The intuition behind eq.3.1 is that for a trend growth episode to last for, say, at least
eight years, the country must “survive” at the same trend growth rate for at least ﬁve
years. This is always true since Pr(D ≥ 5) = 1. Conditional on this, it must survive
the sixth year without trend shifts. This happens with probability (1−α(6)). Given all
this, if no shift happens in the seventh year - an event that has probability (1− α(7)),
the trend growth episode will have lasted 8 years or more: S(8).8
Since, any trend growth episode can end with either a trend up-shift or a trend down-
shift, the overall discrete hazard can be decomposed into two cause-speciﬁc hazards:
α(d) = αU(d) + αD(d)
where
(3.3) αU(d) = Pr(Tj = Tj−1 + d,Δτ(Tj) > 0|Dj ≥ d)
(3.4) αD(d) = Pr(Tj = Tj−1 + d,Δτ(Tj) < 0|Dj ≥ d)






and similarly for SD(d).
Interestingly, while in developing countries, one has to wait for about the same num-
ber of years before an up or a down-shift in trend growth occurs; in developed economies,
we have to be much more patient before up-shifts than before down-shifts. Concretely,








where rk is the number of trend growth episodes lasting for k years, while nk is the number of episodes
that could potentially last k years, i.e. are “at risk” of ending k years after beginning. In survival
literature, rknk is often called the “exit rate”.
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Table 1: Trend growth in developing vs. developed countries
Developing Developed
Std. Growth* 5.3 2.5
Std. Trend Growth* 3.4 1.2
Trend Var. as % of Growth Var.* 41.4 29.5
Up-shifts p.a.* 0.046 0
Down-shifts p.a.* 0.044 0.015
Median absolute shift magnitude* 5.45 2.30
Pr(10 years or more between shifts) 0.310 0.719
Pr(10 years or more until up-shift) 0.568 0.877
Pr(10 years or more until down-shift) 0.590 0.821
Number of Countries 133 20
Number of Up-shifts 322 11
Number of Down-shifts 307 31
Notes: *Median across countries. Std. (standard deviations) in percentage points.
the probability that we will have to wait 10 years or more until observing a trend up-
shift in a developing country is 0.57. This number for a down-shift is very close: 0.59.
By contrast, in developed countries the respective numbers are 0.88 and 0.82 and, as
illustrated in Figure 3.5, the diﬀerence between the two probabilities grows very quickly
as we consider longer horizons. For instance, the probability that we will have to wait
20 years or more before observing an up-shift in a developed economy is still very high
0.76 and well above the probability of waiting the same time until a down-shift: 0.62.
The intuition behind these ﬁndings can be related to standard economic growth
theories as follows. In the process of convergence towards developed-economy status,
countries experiences a similar number of up and down-shifts. Once developed and
located at the technology frontier, however, generating up-shifts becomes much more
diﬃcult: “catch-up” growth is no longer available and growth spurts have to either
come from exogenous technical progress (neo-classical growth model, Solow [38]), or
an increase in savings as a proportion of GDP (AK model, Romer [36]), or innovation
(Schumpeterian model, Aghion and Howitt [3]). At the same time, down-shifts can still
happen because of exogenous shocks, or as a direct consequence of growth slowing down
due to convergence (think about the post WWII reconstruction period slowdowns in
most European countries).
Finally, Table 1 summarizes some stylized facts from this section about how the
growth processes diﬀer in developing and developed economies.
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Although, overall, growth is twice as volatile in developing countries as in developed
ones, the trend is almost three times more volatile and therefore accounts for over
41% of the total growth variance against slightly less than 30% in developed economies.
This corroborates recent research by Aguiar and Gopinath [4] which shows that “emerg-
ing markets are characterized by a volatile trend that determines the behavior of the
economy at business cycle frequencies”. The result implies that understanding the de-
terminants of the trend growth dynamics in developing countries is more important
than in developed economies even in the medium term.
Several conclusions emerge from assessing the overall characteristics of trend growth
durations and shifts. The trend growth path is much more unstable in developing
economies as a group and represents a higher proportion of the overall growth process.
Developing countries experience more trend shifts with larger trend shift magnitudes.
However, contrary to developed countries, where waiting for up-shifts takes longer, up
and down-shifts in developing economies happen roughly at the same rate. Despite
these stylized facts, ﬁgures 3.2 and 3.4 illustrate the vast heterogeneity in country
experiences within groups, while the country-speciﬁc examples discussed earlier (sub-
section 2.3) suggest that an important amount of variation in the duration of trend
growth episodes exists for a given country over time. This implies that a discrete divide
into developing/developed is too simplistic and calls for a more systematic assessment
of the domestic and external macroeconomic factors that make trend growth durations
vary so much within and between countries.
4. Predicting Trend Growth Shifts
Section 2 developed a methodology (iFF) for determining the trend growth rate at
which a country is currently growing by extracting the trend from growth time series as a
sequence of medium/long term growth averages taken over economically and historically
meaningful periods of time. The purpose of the present section is to address our second
motivating question: “How likely is trend growth to shift and in what direction?”
4.1. Econometric framework: a trend-shifting model of growth. We start by
extending the conceptual framework introduced in section 2.1 to achieve a comprehen-
sive description of trend growth dynamics.
Remember that we conceptualize growth g(t) as a process that vibrates around a
trend:
(4.1) g(t) = τ(t) + c(t)
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The cycle c(t) is a zero-mean transitory ﬂuctuation and the trend τ(t) is deﬁned as






g(s) for t ∈ Tj−1 + 1, ..., Tj, j = 1, ...,m+ 1
where Dj = Tj−Tj−1 is the duration of the trend growth episode that starts in Tj−1+1.
The trend is subject to competing domestic and external forces, summarized in the
vector xt−1, which, if strong enough, can shift the trend up or down at time t and make
growth vibrate around a new higher or lower level from t + 1 onwards. In order to
rule out a reverse eﬀect from the trend shift in year t to the level of the time-varying
variables in year t, we only use time t− 1 information to predict time t trend shifts.
In particular, our goal is to model the conditional probabilities of trend growth shift-
ing up or down at time t, given that the last trend shift (or the beginning of the sample)
happened d years ago :
(4.3) Pr(Tj = t,Δτ(Tj) > 0|Tj − Tj−1 ≥ d,xt−1)
(4.4) Pr(Tj = t,Δτ(Tj) < 0|Tj − Tj−1 ≥ d,xt−1)
as functions of the competing forces xt−1.
Without the conditioning on xt−1, equations 4.3 and 4.4 are nothing else than the up
and down-shift hazard rates αU(d) and αD(d), i.e. equations 3.3 and 3.4, rewritten in
calendar time t instead of duration time d by noting that d = t−Tj−1 andDj = Tj−Tj−1.
This arises because we think of trend shifts as recurrent events and adopt what in the
survival literature is sometimes called a “reset-clock” approach. After each trend shift,
we reset the clock to zero, and once the minimum trend growth duration has elapsed,
the country becomes once again “at risk” of experiencing yet another trend shift.
An important assumption underlying “reset-clock” speciﬁcations is that “the pro-
cesses aﬀecting the occurrence of the ﬁrst event are the same as those for the second,
third, and later events” (Allison [6]). In our case, however, trying to disentangle the
competing forces that have systematically been important determinants of trend growth
durations and shifts is precisely the goal, hence this assumption seems fully appropriate.
A potentially more important limitation of a “reset-clock” speciﬁcation is the as-
sumption that the hazards do not depend on all the event history, i.e. only on when
the last trend shift happened but not when the previous shifts had happened. How-
ever, this assumption can be easily relaxed by introducing explanatory variables that
represent the dependency of the hazard on the country’s previous history (Allison [6]),
which is what we do by including among our covariates variables like the trend growth
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rate and growth volatility, estimated on rolling samples, i.e. from the beginning of the
sample up to and including time t − 1, thereby taking into account all the previous
growth history of the country.
Another issue in models with repeatable events is the intra-subject correlation arising
from having multiple observations (and potentially also multiple events) per country. In
what follows, we adopt a so-called “marginal approach” (cf. Grambsch and Therneau
[21] (chapter 8)), which does not include country random or ﬁxed eﬀects, but corrects
the standard variance estimates for intra-country correlations. Diﬀerent approaches
could be explored in future work.
In reality, we have already started investigating the determinants of trend growth
durations in the previous section where we examined how survivor functions change
depending on whether the country is a developing or a developed economy. Since we
were only interested in the eﬀect of one speciﬁc characteristic - an indicator for being a
developing economy, we could proceed in a simple, intuitive way: divide our sample into
developed and developing countries, construct the survivor functions non-parametrically
as explained in footnote 8, plot the results and inspect them visually.
Unfortunately, this simple approach does not work if our goal is to examine the
simultaneous eﬀects of several discrete and continuous characteristics on the hazards.
Moreover, it does not give us one quantitative statistic that summarizes the eﬀect
of a characteristic and which would allow us to gauge its statistical and economic
signiﬁcance, and to compare it to the eﬀects of other characteristics.
A simple way around these issues, is to assume a speciﬁc functional form that relates
the hazards to the characteristics xt−1. Since the discrete-time hazards are conditional
probabilities, the functional form needs to be such that the estimated hazards lie be-
tween 0 and 1 and the hazards of the three possible outcomes - up-shift, down-shift and
no shift - sum to one.
In Cox’s [13] original paper, where he proposed the partial likelihood method for
the estimation of the proportional hazards model for continuous-time survival analysis,
he also suggested that a logit speciﬁcation could be employed in the discrete case and
reduces to a proportional hazards model when the time interval considered gets very
small. Later, the model was extended to the competing risks situation by relating the
covariates xt−1 to the hazards through a multinomial logit speciﬁcation (e.g. Allison












where, for ease of notation, we write αS(t) := αS(t − Tj−1|xt−1) with S = U,D. The
parameters βS capture the cause-speciﬁc eﬀects of the covariates on the S outcome
relative to no shift.
To see the intuition behind this functional form, suppose a country reaches year t
without having yet experienced a novel shift in its trend growth since the last one, and
the minimum trend growth duration has elapsed. What can happen in year t? The
trend can either shift up, shift down or not shift at all. The problem is therefore akin
to a conditional multinomial choice model where the conditional probabilities of the
three possible events/choices are:
αU(t), αD(t) and 1− α(t)
Note that equation 4.5 indeed ensures that the estimated conditional probabilities
lie between 0 and 1, and sum up to 1, since the conditional probability of no shift
(reference category) is:






Appendix 6.1 explains in details how the likelihood function in our case should be
constructed and therefore how the model parameters can be estimated by maximum
likelihood.
To see how the parameters should be interpreted, suppose we have two covariates:
x1t−1 and x2t−1. The probability of experiencing an up-shift in year t relative to ex-
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2 x2t−1) is often called the relative risk associated with covariate values
x1t−1 and x2t−1 . More precisely, exp(βU1 x1t−1+β
U
2 x2t−1) is the risk of an up-shift relative






= βU1 x1t−1 + β
U
2 x2t−1
hence βU1 measures the change in the multinomial log-odds of an up-shift in trend
growth relative to no shift due to a one unit change in x1t−1 holding x2t−1 ﬁxed.
Another, perhaps more intuitive, interpretation arises from writing:
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exp(βU1 (x1t−1 + 1) + β
U
2 x2t−1)




i.e. when x1t−1 increases by one unit while x2t−1 is ﬁxed, the relative up-shift risk is
multiplied by exp(βU1 ) . For instance if exp(β
U
1 ) = 0.8, the risk of an up-shift relative
to no-shift falls by 20%. A value of 1 means there is no eﬀect on the relative up-shift
risk. If exp(βU1 ) > 1, the risk rises by (exp(β
U
1 )− 1)%.
4.2. Results: time-to-shift determinants. The economic history examples dis-
cussed above point to two types of variables that could be of potential interest:
• some characteristics of the growth, political, institutional, external ... environ-
ment which either create favorable (detrimental) conditions for trend up-shifts,
or protect the country from (make it more vulnerable to) down-shifts;
• certain shocks which act as catalysts.
There is an important trade-oﬀ in selecting variables for such a large heterogeneous set
of countries. On the one hand, we want to be able to estimate the model on a relatively
large sample so that our results are not driven by a selected few experiences. On the
other hand, not including certain variables may lead to an omitted variable bias and
aﬀect our coeﬃcient estimates and signiﬁcance.
In what follows, we examine a large set of covariates which can be regrouped into
ﬁve dimensions:
(1) Growth environment: we investigate the eﬀects of the trend growth rate, the
number of years since the last shift, the cyclical component and growth volatility
(standard deviation of annual growth rates). All these variables are estimated
on rolling samples, i.e. for instance, we only use growth data up to and including
t to estimate the trend in year t. Using rolling samples is important because
the estimates of trend growth may change as we ﬁt iFF on enlarged samples if
diﬀerent shift dates are identiﬁed. Hence, using trend growth estimated on the
complete sample would be forward-looking. A similar argument can be advanced
for the other three variables. For instance, using a time-invariant estimate of
growth volatility based on the whole sample of data introduces a look-ahead
bias as it implies that at any point in time we know what would be happening
to growth in the future. It is true that using rolling samples, especially when
these are relatively small, introduces measurement error and could attenuate
our estimated coeﬃcients. However, given our interest in employing this model
as a predictive tool, the look-ahead bias issue seems more important.
(2) Development and Demography: instead of a discrete classiﬁcation of countries
into “developed” and “developing”, we employ a set of variables which capture
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both material and non-material aspects of development: the real GDP p.c. in
Purchasing Power Parity9, fertility, infant mortality, life expectancy, the level
of urbanisation, primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrollment ratios, the
percentage of total population aged less than 14 and the percentage of total
population aged 65 and above. We examine these variables both in levels and
changes over the past 2 years.
(3) Institutions and political stability: we use the POLITY database described in
Gurr et al. [22]. In particular, the Polity 2 score, measured on a scale from
-10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic), changes in the Polity
2 score over the past two years, and the durability of the regime’s authority
(number of years since the last substantive change in authority characteristics
deﬁned as a 3-point change in the Polity score, cf. [22]). To capture politi-
cal stability, we employ the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS).
In particular, the Weighted Conﬂict Index, which is a weighted sum of the
number of assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, government crises,
purges, riots, revolutions and anti-government demonstrations from the Domes-
tic Conﬂict Event Data part of the CNTS. The compilation methods and the
construction of the index are explained in Wilson [41]. We look at the level and
growth in WCI. The latter is winsorized at 100% and a dummy variable equal
to 1 when the WCI increases by 100% or more is included. We also use several
variables from the Political Data part of CNTS: the number of Coups d’Etats,
Major Constitutional Changes, Major Cabinet Changes, Changes in Eﬀective
Executive, and the number of Legislative Elections.
(4) Economic management : we consider the annual inﬂation rate (GDP Deﬂator),
domestic credit to the private sector (% of GDP), gross capital formation (% of
GDP), gross domestic savings (% of GDP). We examine these variables both in
levels and percentage point changes. Two variables capture trade: exports plus
imports (as % of GDP), and the diﬀerence between the annual growth rates
of imports and exports. We also look at the annual depreciation of the oﬃcial
nominal exchange rate against the US dollar. The variable is winsorized above
at 100%, and a dummy tracks winsorized observations. We allow the eﬀect of
the depreciation to be diﬀerent in the case of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime by
including a term which interacts the depreciation with a dummy equal to one if
the exchange rate is ﬁxed.10
9Real GDP per capita in PPP is constructed using the PWT (rgdpe/pop) and extended to 2015 with
World Bank data. All remaining variables are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators,
unless another data source is explicitly speciﬁed.
10We use the IMF AREAER database for the classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes.
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(5) External environment & shocks: we take the annual average and the annual
percentage point change in the daily US T-bill (secondary market, 3 month rate).
For commodity prices, we use the IFS monthly gold, food and oil price indices.
We consider the annual averages, and the growth rates between January and
December. We also interact the annual growth in food/oil prices with a dummy
equal to 1 if the country is a food/oil exporter and another dummy equal to 1
if the country is a food/oil importer. The overall impact of the annual growth
in food/oil prices in year t− 1 therefore enters the hazard functions as follows:
(β + βXI
X
t−1 + βM I
M
t−1)xt−1
where IXt−1 is a dummy equal to 1 if the food/fuel exports represent at least 20%
of merchandise exports in year t − 1. Similarly, IMt−1 is an indicator function
that takes a value of 1 in t − 1 if food/fuel imports represent at least 20% of
merchandise imports in that year.
Given the trade-oﬀ between sample size and omitted variable bias, we proceed sequen-
tially, examining one/two additional categories of variables at a time while keeping
those that have been previously identiﬁed as signiﬁcant. We ﬁt the models both with
and without ﬁve-year dummies to check whether the eﬀects estimated are robust to
the inclusion of some time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. We do not use a full
set of year dummies because it leads to signiﬁcant over-ﬁtting and non-convergence
of the likelihood function, especially in more complex speciﬁcations. Moreover, in our
exploratory exercise, unlike the predictive model of the following subsection, we shall
use the same sets of covariates for both up and down-shift hazards since, a priori, we
do not know which covariates enter which hazard function.
Note that all result tables show exponentiated coeﬃcients, i.e. the interpretation is
in terms of relative risk ratios, as explained above.
We start with a baseline speciﬁcation which only includes the Growth environment
variables: Table 2, models (1) and (2).
The most signiﬁcant variable in economic and statistical terms is the Trend growth
rate. Considering the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, a one percentage point higher trend growth
rate reduces the relative up-shift risk and increases the relative down-shift risk by about
20%. This result illustrates the regression to the mean phenomenon - the idea that an
extended period of high growth is rarely sustainable for a long time and more likely
to be followed by a period of average rather than even higher growth. Pritchett and
Summers [34] have extensively studied this phenomenon in a recent paper, concluding
that empirically it is the “most salient feature of economic growth”. Our study conﬁrms
this ﬁnding since trend growth remains the most signiﬁcant variable throughout the
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Table 2: Growth environment, development and demography
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
Trend growth rate 0.789*** 1.201*** 0.774*** 1.204*** 0.763*** 1.237*** 0.774*** 1.243***
(-9.85) (7.11) (-9.90) (7.93) (-7.01) (5.14) (-6.85) (6.29)
Years since last shift 0.925*** 0.959*** 0.927*** 0.957*** 0.934*** 0.959*** 0.937*** 0.958***
(-6.40) (-4.25) (-5.69) (-4.08) (-4.52) (-3.80) (-4.34) (-3.72)
Cycle 0.934*** 1.125*** 0.932*** 1.112*** 0.905*** 1.156*** 0.905*** 1.147***
(-4.11) (5.81) (-4.31) (4.82) (-4.80) (5.18) (-4.66) (4.75)
Growth Volatility 1.056*** 1.042 1.061*** 1.040 1.027 1.019 1.026 1.020
(2.71) (1.55) (2.91) (1.30) (1.44) (0.86) (1.40) (0.81)
Log(Real GDP p.c. PPP) 0.477*** 1.383* 0.473*** 1.351*
(-3.32) (1.88) (-3.06) (1.68)
Fertility (births per woman) 0.883 1.689*** 0.940 1.621***
(-0.70) (4.04) (-0.34) (3.76)
Infant Mortality 0.989 1.002 0.987 1.000
(-1.38) (0.22) (-1.60) (0.00)
Life Expectancy 0.966 0.974 0.952 0.965
(-1.04) (-0.98) (-1.50) (-1.27)
Urban Population (% total) 1.001 1.005 1.002 1.006
(0.06) (0.75) (0.16) (0.93)
Fertility (change) 0.670 1.167 0.719 1.003
(-1.13) (0.35) (-0.86) (0.01)
Infant Mortality (change) 1.008 1.015 1.017 1.015
(0.32) (0.70) (0.64) (0.71)
Life Expectancy (change) 1.096 0.993 1.151** 0.960
(1.54) (-0.10) (2.24) (-0.60)
Urban Population (ppt. change) 0.959 1.046 0.968 1.020
(-0.67) (0.85) (-0.53) (0.40)
Primary Enrol. (% gross) 0.999 1.008* 1.001 1.007
(-0.19) (1.73) (0.18) (1.61)
Secondary Enrol. (% gross) 1.003 0.997 1.003 0.998
(0.44) (-0.49) (0.38) (-0.29)
Tertiary Enrol. (% gross) 1.002 1.007 1.001 1.008
(0.17) (0.89) (0.12) (0.99)
Primary Enrol. (ppt. change) 0.988 0.994 0.983 0.999
(-0.86) (-0.53) (-1.23) (-0.10)
Secondary Enrol. (ppt. change) 1.016 1.016 1.014 1.014
(0.98) (1.39) (0.79) (1.31)
Tertiary Enrol. (ppt. change) 1.057* 1.010 1.038 1.021
(1.88) (0.37) (1.18) (0.83)
Pop. ages 0-14 (% of total) 0.934* 0.938* 0.917** 0.943*
(-1.76) (-1.90) (-2.17) (-1.76)
Pop. ages >=65 (% of total) 0.857*** 0.971 0.841*** 0.965
(-2.86) (-0.68) (-3.10) (-0.80)
Pop. ages 0-14 (ppt. change) 1.069 1.004 1.042 1.028
(0.66) (0.04) (0.39) (0.27)
Pop. ages >=65 (ppt. change) 1.497 1.146 1.488 1.235
(1.25) (0.55) (1.24) (0.84)
Five Year dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 4062 4062 2856 2856
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.152 0.180 0.204
Notes: Exponentiated coeﬃcients; t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at country level.
Changes taken over past two years. All variables lagged one year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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analysis. On its own (regression not shown), the trend growth rate explains almost
10% of trend up and down-shifts.
The duration of the current trend growth episode (Years since last shift) has a neg-
ative impact on both up and down-shift relative risks. Intuitively, if the country has
been growing at the same trend growth rate for a longer period of time, it is more
likely that this rate corresponds to a long run equilibrium from which the country is
less likely to be destabilized. This variable might also be capturing to some extent the
level of development since, as shown in Figure 3.5, trend growth durations are longer in
developed economies. Indeed, as we introduce variables from our development bucket
into the regression, the magnitude of the eﬀect of duration on up-shifts drops from one
additional year since the last trend shift reducing the relative up-shift risk by 7.5%
(model 1) to decreasing it by 6.6% (model 3).
The eﬀect of the Cycle goes in the same direction as that of the trend: decreases the
likelihood of up-shifts and increases that of down-shifts. Mechanically, the reason can
be explained as follows: the cycle is computed as growth minus the rolling estimate
of the trend. Hence, a higher cycle indicates that our rolling estimate of trend growth
is going up and that a trend down-shift from this higher estimate is even more likely.
Therefore, the cycle accentuates the eﬀect of the trend that we have just discussed.
Higher Growth volatility increases both up and down-shift relative risks although
the eﬀect is statistically insigniﬁcant for down-shifts and becomes also insigniﬁcant for
up-shifts as development variables are introduced. Economically, the eﬀect goes in the
expected direction though - countries with higher growth volatility have shorter trend
growth episodes - hence, we decided to keep this variable as a control.
Including ﬁve-year dummies in speciﬁcation (2) does not greatly aﬀect the magnitude
and signiﬁcance of the growth environment variables, suggesting that these variables
are robust to some unobserved time-varying heterogeneity.
Models (3) and (4) incorporate Development and Demography variables.
A higher level of Real GDP p.c. in PPP decreases the likelihood of up-shifts and
increases that of down-shifts. This result agrees with our earlier discussion of economic
convergence at the end of section 3.2: as countries become more developed, growth slows
down. Relative to the no shift outcome, countries start experiencing less up-shifts and
more down-shifts. The larger and more signiﬁcant eﬀect on the up-shifts was expected
from our previous discussion and the right panel of Figure 3.5. The coeﬃcients are
more diﬃcult to interpret this time since we are looking at the log of the real GDP p.c.
The unexponentiated coeﬃcients are -0.74 and 0.32; hence a 10% higher real GDP p.c.
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this year is associated with a 7% fall in the up-shift relative risk and a 3% rise in the
down-shift relative risk next year.11
Real GDP p.c. only captures the material aspect of development. For instance,
in 2015, Qatar, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates ranked above the devel-
oped country with the highest real GDP p.c. - Norway. Hence, the simple devel-
oped/developing divide gets blurred when we think about development in continuous
terms. Unfortunately, very few variables reﬂecting the non-material side of development
appear to be signiﬁcant. This is not surprising given the results from previous stud-
ies. For instance, Berg et al. [12] examine the signiﬁcance of primary and secondary
education, adult and child mortality (levels and within growth spell changes) for the
duration of growth spells. They only ﬁnd three out of eight variables to be signiﬁcant
at the 10% level.
A high level of Fertility appears to be detrimental to trend growth: one extra child per
woman increases the down-shift relative risk by over 60%. Historically, very high fertility
rates (7-8 children per woman) characterize several African countries, e.g. Rwanda,
Kenya, Oman, Jordan, in the 1970s and 1980s. The damaging eﬀect of fertility could
arise because high fertility is often the ﬂipside of a lower level of female education and
employment which are detrimental to growth and that we are not controlling for in the
regression because this type of data is less common and less reliable.
Higher percentages of Population aged 0 to 14 or 65 and above reduce the relative risk
of up-shifts, with the eﬀect being bigger and more signiﬁcant for the 65 and above age
bracket. The eﬀect is consistent with larger dependency ratios preventing the savings
rate to rise and engender a trend growth up-shift as in a standard AK growth model
(Romer [36]). Conditional on fertility, Population aged 0 to 14 also appears to protect
from down-shifts to some extent, perhaps indicating a potential positive eﬀect on trend
growth arising from a future younger and larger active labour force.12
An argument often put forward for the case that China still has decades left to run at
high growth rates before slowing down is that its level of urbanization, which currently
stands at 55.6% of the total population, is much lower than that of the USA (81.6%).
Given the results in Table 2, we can neither buttress nor reject this argument because
none of the variables related to urbanization are signiﬁcant. However, it seems that the
eﬀect of an increase in Urban population, although insigniﬁcant, goes in the direction
of increasing the likelihood of down-shifts while decreasing that of up-shifts.




for instance, a 10% higher real GDP p.c. multiplies the up-shift relative risk by exp(−0.74 ln(1.1)) 
0.93, a 7% decrease.
12See Higgins [25] for an investigation of how demography and national savings are related and a
discussion of the dependency debate.
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A one percentage point increase in the Tertiary education gross enrollment ratio over
the past two years raises the up-shift relative risk by 5.7% suggesting, as expected,
that more higher education is beneﬁcial for trend growth. The small positive eﬀect of
Primary education on the down-shift relative risk is less intuitive. Both education eﬀects
are only signiﬁcant at the 10% level and not robust to the inclusion of ﬁve-year dummies
in speciﬁcation (4). On the other hand, the beneﬁcial eﬀect of an improvement in Life
expectancy, only appears as signiﬁcant once time eﬀects are included. This weakness
in robustness to the inclusion of other covariates is conﬁrmed in the next set of results,
shown in Table 3, where all three variables completely loose signiﬁcance once we control
for the quality of Institutions, political stability and Economic management.
Acemoglu et al.[1] provide an extensive overview of the various channels through
which weaker institutions may disrupt long term growth. In agreement with this,
we ﬁnd that a one unit lower Polity 2 score (less democratic institutions) increases
the down-shift relative risk by around 5%. Changes in the Polity score are also very
important: as expected, a one unit Amelioration over the past two years reduces the
down-shift relative risk, while a one unit Deterioration increases it. Interestingly, the
Polity score and changes thereof have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the up-shifts, perhaps
indicating that good institutions on their own are not enough to substantially lift trend
growth. The Durability of the Polity regime reduces both up and down-shifts suggesting
that political stability leads to growth stability.
Only one out of the six variables from the CNTS database examined happens to
be signiﬁcant: a dummy equal to 1 if the Weighted Conﬂict Index (WCI) rises by
more than 100%. Conﬂict rise >=100% multiplies the relative risk of down-shift by
2. The ﬁnding that the remaining political stability variables are insigniﬁcant seems a
bit surprising. We investigated whether this may be due to the fact that it takes more
than one year for the event to have an impact on trend growth by re-ﬁtting the model
with the same variables either lagged two years or aggregated over the past two years,
however, no more signiﬁcant eﬀects appeared. We also investigated the components of
the WCI separately, but again with no success. Perhaps, this result is at least in part
due to the quality of the data. The CNTS derives most of the events used to construct
the WCI from the New York Times (cf. Wilson [41]), and it is very likely that many
events, especially in the developing world, go unrecorded. It is also worth mentioning,
however, that previous studies have also found the eﬀect of conﬂict not to be robust
to the inclusion of other covariates. For instance, Hausmann et al. [24] ﬁnd that an
indicator for war becomes insigniﬁcant for the probability of growth collapses when
variables like inﬂation and the change in the Polity score are included in the regression.
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Table 3: Institutions, political stability, and economic management
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
Trend growth rate 0.747*** 1.388*** 0.756*** 1.376*** 0.787*** 1.372*** 0.778*** 1.379***
(-6.72) (6.58) (-6.70) (6.48) (-6.80) (7.24) (-7.38) (7.28)
Years since last shift 0.947*** 0.981 0.951*** 0.983 0.939*** 0.986 0.943*** 0.986
(-2.91) (-1.50) (-2.68) (-1.30) (-3.55) (-1.22) (-3.18) (-1.22)
Cycle 0.891*** 1.235*** 0.887*** 1.218*** 0.926*** 1.208*** 0.919*** 1.198***
(-3.59) (4.47) (-3.62) (4.18) (-2.78) (5.95) (-2.96) (5.35)
Growth Volatility 1.025 0.998 1.025 1.001 1.017 1.012 1.023 1.011
(1.28) (-0.10) (1.26) (0.03) (0.85) (0.79) (1.11) (0.70)
Log(Real GDP p.c. PPP) 0.527*** 1.560* 0.501*** 1.481 0.553*** 1.687*** 0.527*** 1.604**
(-2.80) (1.77) (-3.02) (1.47) (-3.78) (2.79) (-3.84) (2.44)
Fertility (births per woman) 0.710 1.873*** 0.777 1.749** 0.801 1.380** 0.762* 1.406*
(-1.62) (2.83) (-1.16) (2.36) (-1.48) (2.03) (-1.65) (1.81)
Pop. ages 0-14 (% total) 0.956 0.952 0.923** 0.957 0.944** 0.997 0.941* 0.994
(-1.17) (-0.89) (-1.99) (-0.76) (-2.05) (-0.07) (-1.93) (-0.12)
Pop. ages >=65 (% total) 0.939 1.022 0.898* 1.026 0.932* 1.058 0.913* 1.066
(-1.09) (0.30) (-1.74) (0.32) (-1.67) (0.99) (-1.95) (1.05)
Primary Enrol. (% gross) 0.997 1.008 0.997 1.007
(-0.44) (1.41) (-0.38) (1.16)
Tertiary Enrol. (ppt. change) 1.047 1.025 1.027 1.043
(1.18) (1.03) (0.62) (1.61)
Life Expectancy (change) 1.088 0.982 1.105 0.973
(1.00) (-0.28) (1.14) (-0.41)
Polity 2 score (level) 0.993 0.955** 0.999 0.953** 0.973 0.947*** 0.976 0.948***
(-0.30) (-2.27) (-0.04) (-2.27) (-1.48) (-3.24) (-1.26) (-2.85)
Amelioration Polity 2 1.007 0.667*** 0.995 0.677*** 0.980 0.858*** 0.984 0.872**
(0.17) (-3.12) (-0.12) (-3.04) (-0.52) (-2.69) (-0.42) (-2.25)
Deterioration Polity 2 0.933 1.147** 0.911 1.164** 0.997 1.157*** 0.988 1.151**
(-1.15) (2.19) (-1.48) (2.22) (-0.07) (2.60) (-0.28) (2.53)
Durability Polity regime 0.983*** 0.982*** 0.982*** 0.981*** 0.977*** 0.980*** 0.977*** 0.980***
(-2.92) (-3.69) (-2.99) (-3.67) (-3.62) (-4.05) (-3.56) (-3.98)
Coups d’Etats 0.433 2.177 0.415 2.572
(-0.76) (0.88) (-0.81) (1.06)
Major Constitutional Changes 0.853 1.660 0.910 1.529
(-0.39) (1.25) (-0.22) (1.02)
Changes in Eﬀective Executive 1.048 0.963 1.076 0.946
(0.18) (-0.10) (0.28) (-0.15)
Legislative Election 0.998 0.836 0.998 0.856
(-0.01) (-0.68) (-0.01) (-0.57)
Weighted Conﬂict Index (WCI) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.25) (-0.61) (0.69) (-0.73)
WCI growth, win. 1.001 1.001 1.000 1.001
(0.69) (0.43) (0.20) (0.74)
Conﬂict rise >=100% 0.931 2.420*** 0.992 2.260** 0.874 1.963** 0.867 1.942**
(-0.18) (2.70) (-0.02) (2.39) (-0.43) (2.39) (-0.44) (2.33)
Log(1+inﬂation) 1.441 3.959*** 1.392 3.123** 1.259 3.011*** 1.235 2.558**
(0.82) (2.71) (0.79) (2.39) (0.60) (2.70) (0.56) (2.48)
Capital formation (gross, % GDP) 0.983 0.991 0.982 0.995
(-1.31) (-0.66) (-1.27) (-0.35)
Capital formation (ppt. change) 0.996 0.995 0.999 0.994
(-0.13) (-0.16) (-0.05) (-0.19)
Domestic savings (gross, % of GDP) 1.002 1.004 1.004 1.003
(0.30) (0.48) (0.56) (0.36)
Domestic savings (ppt. change) 1.038* 0.958* 1.038* 0.970 1.022 0.959*** 1.024 0.970**
(1.96) (-1.76) (1.91) (-1.21) (1.28) (-2.92) (1.24) (-2.02)
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(5) (6) (7) (8)
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
Domestic credit to private (% GDP) 0.997 1.004 0.996 1.003
(-0.59) (1.12) (-0.68) (0.87)
Domestic credit to private (ppt. change) 0.996 1.026*** 0.996 1.030*** 0.996 1.033*** 0.998 1.036***
(-0.33) (2.78) (-0.30) (2.61) (-0.37) (3.81) (-0.19) (3.55)
Depreciation (LCU/$), win. 1.015** 0.976* 1.014** 0.983 1.014*** 0.987 1.013*** 0.991
(2.56) (-1.78) (2.39) (-1.35) (3.06) (-1.58) (2.85) (-1.13)
Depreciation x Fixed Exchange 0.998 1.019 1.000 1.015
(-0.23) (1.28) (-0.06) (1.04)
Depreciation >=100% 0.0673*** 0.443 0.0802*** 0.446 0.156*** 0.405 0.182** 0.402
(-2.88) (-0.51) (-2.87) (-0.56) (-2.61) (-0.60) (-2.48) (-0.71)
Imports gr. - Exports gr. 1.004 1.018** 1.006 1.017** 0.999 1.016*** 1.001 1.016***
(0.50) (2.52) (0.73) (2.46) (-0.22) (2.90) (0.08) (2.99)
Trade (% of GDP) 1.010*** 1.001 1.012*** 1.001 1.003* 1.000 1.004** 1.000
(2.98) (0.44) (3.38) (0.38) (1.86) (0.21) (2.44) (0.29)
Five Year dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 2194 2194 2625 2625
Pseudo R2 0.243 0.264 0.213 0.237
Exponentiated coeﬃcients; t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at country level. All variables lagged one year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We examine several aspects of Economic management starting with monetary stabil-
ity as measured by the log of 1 plus the annual Inﬂation rate, a standard transformation
in the empirical growth literature. Higher inﬂation signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood
of down-shifts. This result is not surprising; many examples in economic history indi-
cate that inﬂation is a symptom of economic mismanagement. For instance, all four
trend growth down-shifts in Brazil, illustrated in Figure 4.1, were preceded by very
high inﬂation rates: 31% in 1961, 19% in 1972, 56% in 1979 and 145% in 1986, while
the success of the “Plano Real” (1994-2002), which managed to stabilize the Brazilian
economy at the current trend growth rate of 1.8% p.a. since 1993, relied to a large ex-
tent on having achieved monetary stability through measures like a peg of the Brazilian
real to the US dollar and a general indexation of prices (e.g. cf. Feijo et al. [17]).
Another important determinant of macroeconomic stability is the exchange rate. We
look at the Depreciation of the oﬃcial nominal exchange rate against the US dollar. The
coeﬃcient estimates indicate that a one percentage point larger Depreciation raises the
up-shift relative risk by about 1.5%, and this eﬀect does not disappear if the exchange
rate is ﬁxed. One particular channel through which a devaluation this year can boost
growth next year is by making the country’s exports more competitive. However, the
dummy indicator for a devaluation of 100% and more (Depreciation>=100% ) almost
completely annihilates the up-shift relative risk.
Just as human capital accumulation, physical Capital formation does not seem to
be a signiﬁcant predictor of trend growth dynamics. This agrees with two studies
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Figure 4.1 Trend growth in Brazil (1951-2015)
Notes: Trend growth (red) extracted from annual real GDP p.c. growth data (blue) using iFF.
that employ growth accounting techniques (parametric in Jones and Olken [28], non-
parametric in Kerekes [30]) to investigate the sources of important growth changes and
conclude that factor accumulation only plays a negligible role in them so that “even
medium-run growth rate changes are mainly the result of productivity changes”[30].
Two other variables that matter for trend shifts are domestic indebtedness and sav-
ings. Both variables are signiﬁcant in percentage point changes but not in levels. The
positive eﬀect of a rise in Domestic savings on up-shifts disappears as other insignif-
icant covariates are dropped from the up-shift hazard function, cf. speciﬁcations (7)
and (8). However, the protective eﬀect from down-shifts remains signiﬁcant: a one
ppt. increase in domestic savings this year reduces the relative down-shift risk next
year by around 3%. In developing economies, higher internal savings may help avoid
the dramatic economic disruptions caused by sudden outﬂows of foreign investment.
In developed economies, increases in domestic savings can help ﬁnance innovation and
therefore prevent growth from shifting down.
Increases in domestic indebtedness played a prominent role in the most recent down-
shifts. However, as the following table suggests, the lesson that a rise in Domestic
credit to the private sector may not be good for trend growth could perhaps have been
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We also ﬁnd that while a higher proportion of GDP in Trade is prospicious to trend
growth up-shifts, a rising trade deﬁcit (Imports growth - Exports growth) is a symptom
of future trend down-shifts.
The remaining speciﬁcations in Table 3 show that adding ﬁve-year dummies and
dropping insigniﬁcant covariates does not qualitatively alter the eﬀects just identiﬁed
in most cases, even though the precise quantitative estimates may change.
Table 4 keeps the variables previously identiﬁed as signiﬁcant and adds the last
category: External environment & shocks.
The US T-bill rate is considered as the risk-free rate on the market and is therefore
an important determinant of borrowing costs. Model (9) indicates that both high US
rates and rises thereof are bad for trend growth. For instance, a one percentage point
higher US T-bill rate is associated with an 8.5% higher relative down-shift risk and
an 8.2% lower relative up-shift risk. Interestingly, as we include ﬁve year dummies in
speciﬁcation (10), the signiﬁcance of the US T-bill rate drops. The only eﬀect that
remains signiﬁcant is that of the average US T-bill rate on the relative down-shift
risk, which is now much bigger: 17% instead of the previous 8.5%. Although US rate
hikes are not signiﬁcant for trend shifts once we control for unobserved time-varying
heterogeneity, their signiﬁcance in the absence of such controls indicates that they may
be a good proxy for a part of this unobserved heterogeneity which is detrimental for
long-run growth, in particular for up-shifts.
Gold is considered as a safe asset and a hedge in turbulent times. Hence, high
gold prices are an indication of high risk aversion. More risk averse investors will only
lend money at higher rates thereby potentially raising the costs of ﬁnancing growth-
enhancing projects thereby hurting trend growth. Our analysis indicates that although
growth in gold prices is insigniﬁcant, high averages decrease the relative up-shift risk
and increase the relative down-shift risk, with the latter eﬀect being robust to the
inclusion of ﬁve-year dummies.
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Table 4: External environment & shocks
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
Trend growth rate 0.757*** 1.368*** 0.759*** 1.379*** 0.761*** 1.368*** 0.765*** 1.374***
(-7.61) (6.96) (-7.74) (6.68) (-7.43) (6.85) (-7.49) (6.64)
Years since last shift 0.942*** 0.983 0.944*** 0.984 0.942*** 0.983 0.943*** 0.985
(-3.21) (-1.41) (-3.06) (-1.29) (-3.29) (-1.41) (-3.11) (-1.27)
Cycle 0.923*** 1.173*** 0.926** 1.181*** 0.921*** 1.173*** 0.926** 1.178***
(-2.65) (4.41) (-2.47) (4.24) (-2.77) (4.35) (-2.51) (4.25)
Growth Volatility 1.031 1.011 1.031 1.012 1.029 1.011 1.028 1.012
(1.39) (0.74) (1.45) (0.77) (1.34) (0.72) (1.34) (0.75)
Log(Real GDP p.c. PPP) 0.536*** 1.630** 0.509*** 1.480** 0.546*** 1.645*** 0.514*** 1.494**
(-3.60) (2.52) (-3.62) (2.07) (-3.45) (2.58) (-3.48) (2.09)
Fertility (births per woman) 0.733* 1.416* 0.698** 1.404* 0.740* 1.407* 0.702* 1.390*
(-1.79) (1.91) (-1.96) (1.69) (-1.75) (1.88) (-1.93) (1.66)
Pop. ages 0-14 (% total) 0.944* 1.002 0.951 0.995 0.948* 1.003 0.952 0.996
(-1.81) (0.05) (-1.45) (-0.11) (-1.71) (0.06) (-1.43) (-0.09)
Pop. ages >=65 (% total) 0.917* 1.061 0.926 1.070 0.920* 1.060 0.923 1.071
(-1.72) (0.95) (-1.44) (1.04) (-1.67) (0.95) (-1.48) (1.06)
Polity 2 score (level) 0.978 0.948*** 0.981 0.945*** 0.979 0.947*** 0.980 0.945***
(-1.07) (-2.83) (-0.94) (-2.71) (-1.07) (-2.87) (-0.98) (-2.73)
Amelioration Polity 2 0.989 0.780** 0.990 0.784** 0.987 0.778** 0.990 0.782**
(-0.28) (-2.06) (-0.25) (-2.15) (-0.32) (-2.05) (-0.26) (-2.12)
Deterioration Polity 2 1.008 1.190** 0.994 1.206** 1.004 1.191** 0.991 1.206**
(0.18) (2.39) (-0.12) (2.38) (0.09) (2.43) (-0.20) (2.40)
Duration regime 0.977*** 0.979*** 0.977*** 0.979*** 0.978*** 0.979*** 0.977*** 0.979***
(-3.48) (-3.73) (-3.50) (-3.70) (-3.44) (-3.81) (-3.47) (-3.79)
Conﬂict rise >=100% 0.907 2.396*** 0.884 2.208*** 0.926 2.373*** 0.898 2.212***
(-0.28) (3.05) (-0.34) (2.67) (-0.22) (3.02) (-0.30) (2.69)
Log(1+inﬂation) 1.297 1.993* 1.285 2.019* 1.312 2.067* 1.326 2.024*
(0.68) (1.77) (0.67) (1.79) (0.72) (1.89) (0.76) (1.81)
Domestic savings (ppt. change) 1.043** 0.947*** 1.047** 0.956*** 1.043** 0.947*** 1.048*** 0.957***
(2.41) (-3.73) (2.57) (-2.85) (2.37) (-3.77) (2.61) (-2.79)
Domestic credit to private (ppt. change) 1.001 1.034*** 1.001 1.036*** 1.000 1.033*** 0.999 1.035***
(0.11) (3.29) (0.10) (2.81) (-0.05) (3.27) (-0.09) (2.77)
Depreciation (LCU/$), win. 1.011** 0.994 1.012** 0.995 1.011** 0.994 1.011** 0.995
(2.26) (-0.75) (2.35) (-0.71) (2.25) (-0.77) (2.19) (-0.65)
Depreciation >=100% 0.183** 0.382 0.185** 0.428 0.181** 0.341 0.184** 0.423
(-2.34) (-0.89) (-2.31) (-0.81) (-2.31) (-0.99) (-2.26) (-0.79)
Imports gr. - Exports gr. 0.998 1.013** 0.999 1.013** 0.998 1.013** 1.000 1.012**
(-0.38) (2.24) (-0.20) (2.08) (-0.29) (2.21) (-0.07) (2.06)
Trade (% of GDP) 1.004** 1.000 1.004** 1.001 1.004** 1.000 1.004** 1.001
(2.09) (0.10) (2.29) (0.31) (2.07) (0.10) (2.32) (0.34)
US T-bill (annual change, ppt.) 0.890* 1.089 0.977 1.103 0.873** 1.089 0.928 1.098
(-1.83) (1.55) (-0.30) (1.59) (-2.07) (1.59) (-0.99) (1.59)
US T-bill (annual average) 0.918* 1.085*** 0.912 1.170* 0.928* 1.092*** 0.900* 1.146*
(-1.86) (2.60) (-1.37) (1.74) (-1.67) (2.83) (-1.70) (1.77)
Gold price index (annual growth) 0.991 0.997 0.996 1.000
(-1.09) (-0.50) (-0.43) (-0.00)
Gold price index (annual average) 0.976*** 1.018*** 1.004 1.043*** 0.976*** 1.020*** 1.005 1.039***
(-3.02) (3.30) (0.19) (3.60) (-3.09) (3.57) (0.29) (3.78)
Food price index (annual growth) 1.012 1.044*** 0.996 1.032** 0.999 1.040*** 0.989 1.035***
(0.77) (4.10) (-0.23) (2.42) (-0.08) (4.83) (-0.82) (3.46)
Food(growth) x Exporter 1.007 0.968*** 1.010 0.969*** 1.007 0.968*** 1.010 0.969***
(0.44) (-2.66) (0.55) (-2.65) (0.44) (-2.69) (0.57) (-2.68)
Food(growth) x Importer 0.993 0.984 0.992 0.984
(-0.41) (-0.82) (-0.42) (-0.87)
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(9) (10) (11) (12)
Up Down Up Down Up Down Up Down
Oil price index (annual growth) 0.996 1.000 0.994 1.003
(-0.91) (-0.05) (-1.38) (0.70)
Oil(growth) x Exporter 0.995 0.991** 0.995 0.992* 0.992 0.991** 0.992 0.994
(-0.69) (-2.12) (-0.69) (-1.86) (-1.24) (-2.31) (-1.32) (-1.42)
Oil(growth) x Importer 0.995 1.006 0.996 1.006
(-0.59) (1.23) (-0.48) (1.22)
Five Year dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 2464 2464 2464 2464
Pseudo R2 0.241 0.259 0.238 0.255
Exponentiated coeﬃcients; t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at country level.
All variables lagged one year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Annual averages of gold, food and oil prices are highly correlated: 0.9 correlation
between gold and food, 0.94 correlation between gold and oil. In order to avoid multi-
collinearity issues, we therefore decided to only focus on food and oil price growth rates
and allow the eﬀects to be diﬀerent for respective exporters and importers.
Rising Food prices may increase global food insecurity and poverty, especially in
developing countries (cf. e.g. Azzarri et al. [7]), thereby being detrimental to trend
growth. Indeed, we ﬁnd that a one percentage point higher annual growth rate in
food prices raises the down-shift relative risk by about 4.4%. This detrimental eﬀect,
however, is reversed if the country is a food exporter. In Table 4, the only signiﬁcant
eﬀect of rising Oil prices is to slightly protect oil exporting countries from down-shifts.
In further regressions, not shown here but available on request, we investigated several
other variables that often appear in the empirical growth literature while keeping the
ones that we had already found as signiﬁcant. The reason for not including these
variables in the main speciﬁcations presented above is that they reduce the sample size
dramatically thereby making results incomparable across speciﬁcations, while at the
same time often being insigniﬁcant.
For instance, we found terms of trade growth to be insigniﬁcant while shrinking the
sample size from 2464 to 1625. Foreign direct investment net inﬂows and outﬂows as
a % of GDP are once again insigniﬁcant both in levels and ppt. changes, but reduce
the sample size to 1768. We investigated the importance of the sectoral composition
of the economy by including ﬁve variables: the annual growth rates in the value added
by the agricultural, manufacturing, and services sectors, and the values added as a %
of GDP of the manufacturing and services sectors. The sample size dropped to 1802
and the only eﬀect signiﬁcant at 10% and robust to the inclusion of ﬁve year dummies
was that of the growth in the services sector on down-shifts: a one ppt. higher service
sector growth increased the relative down-shift risk by about 3.6-3.8%.
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Finally, we also looked at short term debt as a percentage of total external debt,
ﬁnding that a one percentage point higher level increases the down-shift relative risk
by almost 5%. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level, and robust to the inclusion of
ﬁve year dummies. However, unfortunately, including this variable shrinks the sample
size from 2464 observations to 1391, mainly because the World Bank provides data on
short term debt only for developing countries.
4.3. Assessing trend growth prospects. We now wish to turn the insights gained
in the previous section about what makes trend growth episodes more or less likely to
end next year with an up or a down-shift into a predictive tool that can be used to
answer our second motivating question - “How likely is trend growth to change and in
what direction?” - in real time.
Ideally, we would like to employ all the variables identiﬁed as signiﬁcant in the
previous section to give estimates of the conditional probabilities of up and down-
shifts in 2016 for most of the countries in our sample. Unfortunately, because of a large
number of missing values in 2015, this is not possible. For instance, at the time of
writing this paper, the World Bank had updated fertility data for only one country.
More annoyingly, some important countries like China and India missed data on either
domestic savings or trade.
Although we hope that future research will employ the trend-shifting framework de-
veloped in this paper on better datasets and build more interesting and comprehensive
predictive models, in what follows, we adopt a less ambitious approach in terms of vari-
ables included, but which nevertheless allows us to compare our 2016 hazard estimates
for 120 out of the 153 countries for which we have extracted trend growth using iFF.
The up and down-shift hazard estimates reported in Table 7 in the Appendix are con-
structed using the model shown in Table 5. To get to this model, we re-estimated spec-
iﬁcation (9) without fertility, domestic savings and the trade variables, then dropped
all insigniﬁcant eﬀects. Amelioration in Polity 2 score, inﬂation and growth in oil prices
for oil exporters became insigniﬁcant, while growth volatility now signiﬁcantly increases
both up and down-shift risks, and a one percentage point higher growth in oil prices
decreases the relative up-shift risks around the world by 0.4%. All the other eﬀects
go in the same direction as before except for the eﬀect of Pop. ages 0-14 (% total) on
down-shifts. A one percentage point larger population in the 0-14 ages bracket now
increases the relative down-shift risk by about 7.7%. Note that the protective relation-
ship found in speciﬁcations (3) and (4) already became insigniﬁcant as we introduced
further controls in speciﬁcations (5) to (12). However, here the eﬀect goes signiﬁcantly
in the other direction because we are no longer controlling for fertility. Unsurprisingly,
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Table 5: Predictive model
Up Down
Trend growth rate 0.777*** 1.271***
(-8.22) (6.41)




Growth Volatility 1.047** 1.025*
(2.04) (1.68)
Log(Real GDP p.c. PPP) 0.633*** 1.610***
(-3.51) (3.67)
Pop. ages 0-14 (% total) 0.913*** 1.077***
(-3.64) (3.17)
Pop. ages >=65 (% total) 0.897** 1.108***
(-2.43) (2.77)
Polity 2 score (level) 0.942***
(-4.33)
Deterioration Polity 2 1.132*
(1.75)
Duration Polity regime 0.987*** 0.988***
(-3.07) (-2.64)
Conﬂict rise >=100% 2.047***
(2.65)
Domestic credit to private (ppt. change) 1.038***
(4.31)




US T-bill (annual average) 0.938* 1.068**
(-1.79) (2.47)
US T-bill (annual change) 0.903* 1.114**
(-1.89) (2.38)
Gold price (annual average) 0.984*** 1.019***
(-2.97) (4.05)
Food price (annual growth) 1.035***
(4.80)
Food price (growth) x Exporter 0.977**
(-2.21)




Exponentiated coeﬃcients; t statistics in parentheses.
Std. errors clustered at the country level. All variables lagged one year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Estimated up and down-shift hazards, summary statistics
Up-shift Hazard Down-shift Hazard
Correlation with Up-shifts 0.188 -0.071
Correlation with Down-shifts -0.075 0.206
Mean during Up-shifts 0.177 0.043
Median during Up-shifts 0.134 0.022
Mean during Down-shifts 0.035 0.236
Median during Down-shifts 0.018 0.133
Standard deviation 0.107 0.137
the two variables have a correlation of 0.91. Hence, once fertility is excluded Pop. ages
0-14 starts capturing its negative eﬀect discussed above.
Also note that we are not including ﬁve-year dummies. The reason is that in this
section, unlike the previous one where we were interested in establishing the robustness
of our variables to some unobserved time-varying heterogeneity, what we are really
looking for is to ﬁnd a certain combination of observable domestic and external variables
which, taken together, have historically been signiﬁcant predictors of up and down-
shifts and that we have previously identiﬁed as being robust to such unobserved time
eﬀects. We could interpret our exercise as wanting to create indices of trend growth
instability based on a certain combination of observable domestic and external variables.
Unobserved time eﬀects are not something that we can measure in real time and that
could help us predict when the current trend growth episodes will end.
The parsimonious predictive model explains almost 20% of trend shifts, which com-
pares well with the more complex speciﬁcations we had before and is quite high given
the unpredictable nature of such events. It is better at predicting down-shifts than
up-shifts since, as shown in Table 6, the estimated up-shift hazards have a 0.188 corre-
lation with the up-shifts, while the correlation between down-shifts and the estimated
down-shift hazards is higher: 0.206.13 This is not surprising since the up-shift hazard
is modelled as a function of 14 variables, whereas the down-shift hazard reacts to 17
variables.
The mean up-shift hazard is over four times higher during up-shifts than during
down-shifts (0.177 vs 0.043) and the ratio is around 6 when looking at the median. A
more pronounced result holds for down-shifts (6.7 for the mean and 7.4 for the median).
However, the mean and median hazard estimates remain quite low, suggesting both that
13These correlations are based on the whole sample of 5384 observations for which we can compute
the hazards and not only the 3017 observations used to estimate the model.
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Figure 4.2 Actual trend shifts & estimated hazards
trend shifts are very hard to foretell, and that the model could be improved upon in
order to achieve more accurate predictions of trend growth dynamics.
Another interesting way to gauge the performance of the model is to compare the
average up and down-shift hazards estimated with the temporal distribution of trend up
and down-shifts, analysed in section 3. Figure 4.2 superposes the average up and down-
shift hazards estimated for each year with the percentage of countries experiencing up
and down-shifts in that year. As we can see, the average hazards seem to follow the
pattern of the percentages of the respective trend shifts fairly well. In particular, the
average down-shift hazard often dominates the average up-shift hazard at the same
times as the percentage of down-shifts is larger than the percentage of trend up-shifts
and vice versa. More precisely, the correlations (1965 - 2010) between the average
hazards and the percentages of countries experiencing shifts are:
% Countries experiencing
Average Hazard Up -Shifts Down-Shifts
Up 0.378 -0.579
Down -0.383 0.629
It is interesting that although the average up-shift hazard is worse at describing the
pattern of when up-shifts happen than the down-shift hazard is for the down-shifts:
0.378 correlation vs. 0.629; the up-shift hazard is more sensitive to when down-shifts
happen (-0.579 correlation) than is the down-shift hazard for when up-shifts happen
(-0.383 correlation).
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Figure 4.3 Estimated hazards for Brazil
Note: Domestic credit to private sector data missing between 1986 and 1988.
Note that because we assume a minimum trend growth duration of 5 years when
extracting trend growth using iFF, we do not ﬁnd any trend shifts after 2010. Moreover,
all the hazard estimates since 2010 are out-of-sample by construction because none of
the observations after 2010 are used in the estimation. The evolution of these out-of-
sample hazard estimates suggests that many countries might have experienced down-
shifts in this period.
One such country is perhaps Brazil. According to Serrano and Summa [37], Brazil
has been living through a challenging period since 2011. Figure 4.3 plots the evolution
of the estimated hazards for Brazil, showing that there is indeed a spike in the down-
shift hazard in 2011. Table 7 tells us that Brazil has been growing at a trend growth
rate of 1.76% p.c. p.a. since 1993 (last trend shift in 1992). Taking this into account,
the conditional probabilities of Brazilian trend growth shifting either up or down from
this 1.76% trend in 2016 are quite low: 2.8% and 1.6%. A shift in trend growth is a
shift in the average growth rate for at least the next ﬁve years. These probabilities
therefore tell us that it is not very likely that the average Brazilian trend growth over
at least the next ﬁve years will be very diﬀerent from 1.76% p.a.
Back in 2011, the rolling estimate of Brazilian trend growth computed using iFF on
growth time series up to and including 2010 was 3.29%. As shown in Figure 4.3, in
2011, we would have said that there was a 20% probability that Brazil would grow at a
trend growth rate that is at least 3 percentage points lower than this 3.29% trend rate
over the ﬁve years following 2011, i.e. an average growth rate of close to 0% or below
50
Figure 4.4 Estimated hazards for Argentina
for the years 2012 to at least 2016.14 Today, in 2016, using data up to and including
2015, we estimate at 1.6% the probability of the event that Brazil experiences a trend
down-shift of at least 3 percentage points from its current estimate of trend growth at
1.76%, i.e. grows at a rate of -1.24% p.a. or below between 2017 and at least 2021.
Inspecting the evolution of the hazards visually in Figure 4.3, it seems that down
(up) shifts often coincide with spikes in down (up) shift hazards around the shift date,
or at least an important rise in the down (up) shift hazard and a fall in the up (down)
shift hazard. For instance, for Brazil, 1967 and 1992 are up-shifts, while 1973 and 1980
are down-shifts (cf. Figure 4.1).
This observation is not speciﬁc to Brazil. Figure 4.5 shows the trend growth path
for Argentina. However, by simply looking at Figure 4.4 we could have already guessed
that 1969, 1980, 1997 and 2007 were trend growth down-shifts, whereas 1990 and 2002
were up-shifts.
Argentina’s history provides an interesting concrete example which may help us think
about how this predictive model could be useful in practice. As shown in Figure 4.4,
Argentina’s up-shift hazard was rising and the down-shift hazard falling between 2000
and 2003. In 2001, when rating agencies slashed the country’s credit rating, the rolling
estimate of trend growth was 1.49% p.a. since 1996. The probability of Argentina
experiencing a further one percentage point or more down-shift from this trend rate was
only 2%, while the probability of the country experiencing an at least three percentage
14Remember that 3 percentage points is the threshold imposed for a down-shift after an up-shift when
extracting trend growth. Figure 4.1 shows that 1992 was an up-shift for Brazil.
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Figure 4.5 Trend growth in Argentina (1951-2015)
Notes: Trend growth (red) extracted from annual real GDP p.c. growth data (blue) using iFF.
points up-shift for at least the next 5 years was already 8%. In 2002, when Argentina
declared default, the trend growth rate estimate (based on data up to and including
2001) slipped to -0.45% p.a. since 1997, while the conditional probability of an up-shift
in trend growth rose to 26.2% and that of a down-shift fell to only 0.8%. In 2003, as food
prices recovered (annual growth rate of 12.7% in 2002), the up-shift hazard jumped even
further to 38%. Hence, as Tenreyro [40] argues: “the 2001-2002 Argentine crisis could
and should have been averted [...] had international creditors (and rating agencies)
waited for a couple more years”, since even a simple model as the one considered here
would have pointed to a higher trend growth scenario over the next few years as being
much more likely that a further down-shift. And this, even before the food prices
started recovering: the 2002 hazards only use 2001 data when food prices actually fell
by 3.63%.
As a ﬁnal example we consider China. Currently, we estimate that China has been
growing at 6.81% p.a. since 2008 (last trend down-shift in 2007, cf. Table 7). The
conditional probability of a further, at least 1% point, down-shift this year that would
make China grow, on average, at 5.8% p.a. or less over at least the next ﬁve years is
17.3%. On the other hand, a 3 percentage points trend up-shift is a 1% probability
event.
Note that the still very high trend rate at which China is currently growing is certainly
contributing to the relatively large down-shift hazard.15 However, several other factors
15According to our estimates in Table 7, China is currently ranked ﬁfth in terms of highest trend
growth rate, just below Ethiopia (8.02% p.a. since 2004) and slightly overtaking Myanmar (6.80% p.a.
since 2011).
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taken into account in our model are also hampering China’s growth prospects. To
see this, we can compare China with other countries that are also growing at high
trend growth rates currently but have relatively low down-shift hazards. For instance,
India has been growing at 5.32% p.a. since 1994 but has a conditional probability of
experiencing a trend growth down-shift of only 5.2%. The diﬀerence between hazard
estimates arises because India has a much higher Polity 2 score than China (9 versus
-7). Moreover, in 2015, China experienced a much larger build up of domestic credit
to the private sector than India: 13.41% pts. rise in China vs. 0.85% pts. increase in
India. Finally, India’s growth is also much less volatile China’s: standard deviation of
3.24 against 6.15 in China.
In 2016, the average estimated down-shift hazard was still above its up-shift coun-
terpart: 0.07 versus 0.043. However, Figure 4.2 suggests that the down-shift hazard
has been on average falling and the up-shift hazard rising since 2013. A relatively mild
external environment in 2015 with, for instance, a US 3-month T-bill average rate of
only 0.05% that actually fell by 0.03 percentage points throughout the year, has cer-
tainly aided this trend. However, future rises in US rates will negatively aﬀect growth
prospects, while rising commodity prices may negatively impact non-commodity ex-
porters. Moreover, gold prices are still at historically high levels, indicating a high level
of risk aversion, which may also be detrimental to trend growth.
5. Conclusion & Future Research
Assessing a country’s growth prospects is challenging because trend growth is inher-
ently unobserved, and a large number of diﬀerent domestic and external factors come
into interplay at the very same time and could either improve the country’s trend growth
rate, or worsen it, or counterbalance each other and make the country vibrate around
the current trend rate for another several years. Disagreement about a country’s growth
outlook often arises because diﬀerent people weight these factors diﬀerently and/or use
diﬀerent techniques to extract the trend component from growth time series data.
This paper embraces the basic deﬁnition of trend growth as a medium/long term
average growth rate and develops a comprehensive empirical methodology which allows
us to address the following two questions: What is the trend growth rate at which a
country is currently growing? How likely is it to shift and in what direction?
The methodology proposed has two components: a trend extraction method that
builds on the “Fit and Filter” (FF) approach developed in Kar, Pritchett, Raihan,
and Sen (2013) to identify the dates at which trend growth changes signiﬁcantly, then
extract the trend from growth time series as a sequence of medium/long term averages,
and an econometric framework, which employs an extended version of discrete-time
duration analysis to model and estimate the up and down-shift hazards - the conditional
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probabilities of up and down-shifts in trend growth next year, conditional on the country
having already grown at the current trend growth estimate since the last trend shift.
We employ this methodology on most recent data (up to and including 2015) to
give trend growth estimates for 153 countries and up and down-shift hazard estimates
for 120 of them. The predictive model developed so far relates the up and down-shift
hazards to 20 diﬀerent variables capturing the current growth environment, the level
of development, demographics, institutions, political stability, economic management,
and external shocks, and explains almost 20% of trend growth dynamics.
Future research could certainly extend the set of variables considered and build more
interesting and comprehensive models.
6. Appendix
6.1. Estimation. To construct the likelihood function in our case, let’s start by con-
sidering one speciﬁc trend growth episode.
Remember that a trend growth episode starts in the year following the last trend
shift Tj−1 + 1 or the beginning of the sample if Tj−1 = T0 - the year in which we have
GDP p.c. data for the ﬁrst time. It ends in the year of the new trend shift Tj or with
the end of the sample if Tj = T . The likelihood contribution of a trend growth episode
depends on how it ends.
Consider, an episode that ends at Tj with a trend up-shift. For this to happen, the
country must have survived at a constant trend growth rate from Tj−1+1 to Tj−1, and
conditional on this, experienced a trend up-shift at Tj. Since Pr(Tj − Tj−1 ≥ δ) = 1,











Similarly for the likelihood contribution of a trend growth episode ending with a
trend down-shift. In the last case of a trend growth episode ending with the end of the
sample, the only thing that we really know is that the trend growth duration of the







Putting together LU , LD and LC , we can write the likelihood contribution of any















where I[.] is the indicator function.
Now, let’s consider country i with trend shifts Ti = {Ti1, ..., Tim}. The likelihood










where n is the number of countries in our sample.









{IU logαU(k)+ID logαD(k)+(1−IU−ID) log(1−αU(k)−αD(k))}
where IU = I[Δτ(k) > 0] and ID = I[Δτ(k) < 0].
The vectors of parameters βU and βD can be estimated by substituting the hazard
functions 4.5 into eq.6.4 and maximizing it with respect to them.
Several sources in the survival literature, including Allison [6], Jenkins [27], and
Allignol et al.[5] explain how such discrete-time competing risk models can be estimated
in practice by using standard statistical software for multinomial logits on appropriately
re-organized datasets.
6.2. Estimated trend growth rates and trend shift hazards.
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Table 7: Trend growth & conditional probabilities of trend shifts
Trend Last Shift Up-Shift Hazard Down-Shift Hazard
Country Growth Year Magnitude Average 2015 2016 Average 2015 2016
Albania 3.01 2008 -4.26 0.034 0.048 0.049 0.123 0.059 0.049
Algeria 1.94 1994 4.29 0.07 0.02 0.025 0.177 0.072 0.088
Angola 0.75 2008 -7.97 0.036 0.015 0.019 0.272 0.204 0.169
Argentina 2.03 2007 -5.5 0.108 0.031 NA 0.087 0.136 NA
Armenia 0.64 2008 -11.94 0.1 0.1 0.155 0.213 0.09 0.026
Australia 1.92 1951 NA 0.006 0 0 0.012 0.013 0.011
Austria 0.08 2008 -2.06 0.017 0.015 0.017 0.047 0.041 0.034
Azerbaijan 1.05 2009 -19.1 0.161 0.107 0.162 0.332 0.121 0.069
Bahrain -0.09 1993 -3.89 0.136 0.035 0.044 0.074 0.165 0.067
Bangladesh 4.86 2003 2.11 0.065 0.029 0.029 0.085 0.116 0.081
Belarus 2.2 2008 -8.24 0.058 0.04 0.095 0.304 0.176 0.07
Belgium 1.55 1974 -2.11 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.03 0.053 0.041
Benin 1.31 1960 NA 0.049 0.001 0.001 0.048 0.017 0.011
Bhutan 5.23 1990 -5.87 0.012 0.01 0.01 0.134 0.064 0.059
Bolivia 3.14 2003 1.67 0.1 0.015 0.016 0.065 0.088 0.053
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.66 2008 -4.03 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Botswana 2.83 1989 -7.6 0.019 0.006 0.006 0.063 0.036 0.028
Brazil 1.76 1992 3.62 0.079 0.032 0.028 0.113 0.077 0.016
Bulgaria 0.92 2008 -5.94 0.079 0.031 0.035 0.11 0.069 0.054
Burkina Faso 3.01 1994 1.96 0.052 0.01 0.015 0.083 0.096 0.058
Burundi 4.74 2010 -5.32 0.143 0.013 0.041 0.099 0.113 0.12
Cambodia 4.46 2007 -3.38 0.049 0.03 0.032 0.149 0.246 0.103
Cameroon 2.45 2010 1.34 0.103 0.01 0.031 0.096 0.101 0.105
Canada 1.93 1951 NA 0.009 NA NA 0.019 NA NA
Central African Rep. -6.71 2010 -8.04 0.169 0.42 0.387 0.032 0.01 0.016
Chad 3.31 2010 -1.13 0.117 0.008 0.019 0.143 0.282 0.18
Chile 2.63 1997 -3.51 0.086 0.018 0.017 0.104 0.054 0.046
China 6.81 2007 -3.14 0.039 0.008 0.01 0.173 0.336 0.173
China. Hong Kong 1.96 2007 -4.5 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Colombia 3.43 2002 4.19 0.033 0.013 0.019 0.042 0.047 0.038
Comoros -0.57 1984 -1.55 0.075 0.019 NA 0.028 0.017 NA
Congo 2.13 1999 4.1 0.09 0.009 0.013 0.157 0.199 0.142
Costa Rica 2.63 1983 5.45 0.027 0.003 0.002 0.018 0.015 0.013
Coˆte d’Ivoire 3.01 2007 4.98 0.102 0.017 0.021 0.078 0.229 0.179
Croatia -1.5 2008 -5.97 0.074 0.067 0.07 0.102 0.06 0.041
Cyprus -3.32 2008 -5.86 0.041 0.121 0.106 0.1 0.016 0.041
Czech Republic 0.37 2007 -4.89 0.069 0.029 0.027 0.09 0.16 0.138
D.R. of the Congo 4.69 2009 2.74 0.265 0.016 0.016 0.078 0.202 0.167
Denmark 1.49 1969 -3.36 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.031 0.019 0.015
Djibouti 4.31 2005 3.04 0.106 0.027 NA 0.068 0.087 NA
Dominican Republic 4.32 2004 3.03 0.045 0.01 0.013 0.111 0.185 0.099
Ecuador 1.32 1976 -7.81 0.051 0.005 NA 0.092 0.038 NA
Egypt 0.31 2010 -2.65 0.029 0.051 0.055 0.129 0.204 0.111
El Salvador 1.76 1995 -3.11 0.091 0.015 0.014 0.035 0.034 0.024
Equatorial Guinea -4.32 2009 -18.91 0.094 0.028 0.208 0.492 0.228 0.012
Estonia 0.56 2007 -8.28 0.057 0.029 0.032 0.19 0.131 0.103
Ethiopia 8.02 2003 8.47 0.15 NA NA 0.081 NA NA
Fiji 1.99 1987 3.32 0.069 0.013 0.014 0.063 0.074 0.065
Finland -1.01 2007 -4.69 0.029 0.015 0.015 0.054 0.044 0.043
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Trend Last Shift Up-Shift Hazard Down-Shift Hazard
Country Growth Year Magnitude Average 2015 2016 Average 2015 2016
France -0.06 2007 -1.8 0.017 0.013 0.015 0.083 0.134 0.063
Gabon 3.49 2009 6.43 0.072 0.017 0.022 0.217 0.237 0.177
Gambia -0.02 1961 NA 0.052 0.002 NA 0.024 0.033 NA
Georgia 4.72 2007 -6.16 0.166 0.026 0.047 0.176 0.208 0.098
Germany 1.25 1991 -1.22 0.029 0.005 0.006 0.071 0.131 0.092
Ghana 4.88 2007 2.79 0.117 0.032 NA 0.068 0.101 NA
Greece -3.17 2007 -6.67 0.053 0.042 0.037 0.095 0.051 0.06
Guatemala 1.33 1986 4.77 0.049 0.006 0.006 0.07 0.046 0.034
Guinea -0.88 2008 -1.2 0.058 0.009 0.11 0.036 0.033 0.019
Guinea-Bissau 0.89 2003 3.45 0.13 0.065 0.066 0.051 0.04 0.042
Haiti 2.31 2010 3.67 0.193 0.046 0.096 0.042 0.066 0.079
Honduras 1.49 1986 3.11 0.04 0.011 NA 0.047 0.025 NA
Hungary 0.65 2006 -3.7 0.091 0.023 0.029 0.063 0.16 0.046
India 5.32 1993 3.27 0.038 0.004 0.004 0.033 0.071 0.052
Indonesia 4.09 2001 5.22 0.074 0.019 0.02 0.099 0.139 0.063
Iran (Islamic Rep. of) 0 2007 -5.42 0.142 0.115 NA 0.179 0.232 NA
Iraq 2.05 2008 -10.35 0.017 0.064 0.051 0.475 0.124 0.097
Ireland -0.15 2007 -3.62 0.01 0.008 0.009 0.044 0.063 0.02
Israel 1.8 1973 -6.24 0.022 0.001 0.001 0.092 0.09 0.068
Italy -1.29 2007 -1.84 0.026 0.016 0.018 0.06 0.085 0.034
Jamaica -0.75 2007 -1.07 0.063 0.063 0.054 0.034 0.017 0.014
Japan 0.7 1991 -2.97 0.027 0.003 0.003 0.065 0.055 0.103
Jordan -0.12 2008 -4.44 0.112 0.046 0.041 0.158 0.104 0.105
Kazakhstan 3.09 2007 -6.32 0.117 0.024 0.031 0.232 0.189 0.124
Kenya 2.64 2003 3.39 0.053 0.019 0.019 0.069 0.149 0.073
Kuwait -3.43 2006 -9.25 0.15 0.253 0.143 0.244 0.027 0.18
Kyrgyzstan 3.27 1995 16.59 0.155 0.034 0.038 0.055 0.05 0.062
Lao People’s DR 5.23 1993 3.37 0.03 NA NA 0.103 NA NA
Latvia 0.65 2007 -10.65 0.095 0.032 NA 0.213 0.108 NA
Lebanon -3.06 2010 -8.95 0.2 0.295 0.241 0.179 0.036 0.06
Lesotho 3.73 2005 1.16 0.032 0.037 NA 0.08 0.055 NA
Liberia 4.98 2007 8.67 0.081 0.038 NA 0.166 0.124 NA
Lithuania 2.59 2007 -7.17 0.073 0.018 NA 0.189 0.151 NA
Madagascar -1.17 2008 -4.46 0.113 0.123 0.114 0.028 0.039 0.039
Malawi 0.66 2009 -3.1 0.112 0.058 NA 0.094 0.071 NA
Malaysia 2.56 1997 -3.73 0.035 0.016 0.021 0.141 0.111 0.073
Mali 2.01 1984 3.67 0.079 0.006 0.007 0.053 0.081 0.099
Mauritania 1.53 2007 -3.89 0.086 NA NA 0.157 NA NA
Mauritius 3.72 1988 -3.13 0.036 0.006 0.007 0.043 0.026 0.033
Mexico 1.15 1986 3.73 0.038 0.01 0.011 0.101 0.059 0.024
Mongolia 8.82 2010 3 0.075 0.013 0.016 0.111 0.13 0.055
Montenegro 0.89 2008 -4.01 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Morocco 3.24 1995 3.81 0.04 0.013 0.013 0.088 0.045 0.037
Mozambique 4.46 2001 -4.43 0.043 0.011 0.013 0.13 0.106 0.174
Myanmar 6.8 2010 -4.3 0.249 0.039 NA 0.253 0.417 NA
Namibia 3.34 2003 2.14 0.032 0.014 0.011 0.103 0.09 0.1
Nepal 2.86 1983 2.45 0.052 0.009 0.009 0.039 0.046 0.061
Netherlands 1.52 1973 -2.35 0.016 0.001 0.001 0.032 0.022 0.014
New Zealand 1.22 1966 -3.49 0.016 NA NA 0.017 NA NA
Nicaragua 2.51 1993 6.32 0.097 0.017 0.018 0.066 0.08 0.032
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Trend Last Shift Up-Shift Hazard Down-Shift Hazard
Country Growth Year Magnitude Average 2015 2016 Average 2015 2016
Niger 1.87 2004 2.09 0.16 0.023 0.031 0.055 0.087 0.052
Nigeria 3.11 2006 -5 0.134 0.01 NA 0.162 0.305 NA
Norway -0.33 2007 -3.23 0.008 NA NA 0.031 NA NA
Oman -4.38 2010 -6.84 0.037 0.228 0.151 0.2 0.014 0.049
Pakistan 2.44 1960 2.18 0.029 0.001 0.001 0.057 0.038 0.011
Panama 5.74 2003 4.2 0.043 0.006 0.007 0.139 0.233 0.125
Paraguay 4.99 2009 1.85 0.062 0.018 0.025 0.1 0.119 0.09
Peru 4.37 2002 3.8 0.098 0.018 0.018 0.087 0.142 0.135
Philippines 3.76 2002 2.7 0.068 0.015 0.013 0.06 0.075 0.102
Poland 4.18 1993 6.87 0.073 0.007 0.008 0.071 0.069 0.053
Portugal 0.01 2001 -2.23 0.041 0.014 0.016 0.093 0.039 0.032
Qatar 1.6 2001 -5.93 0.168 0.042 0.041 0.109 0.154 0.088
Republic of Korea 3.63 1996 -4.74 0.034 0.01 0.011 0.19 0.132 0.091
Republic of Moldova 2.99 2008 -3.68 0.336 0.102 0.187 0.036 0.039 0.026
Romania 1.25 2008 -6.14 0.074 0.033 0.036 0.12 0.096 0.072
Russian Federation 0.33 2008 -6.89 0.144 0.069 0.146 0.186 0.091 0.026
Rwanda 4.29 2008 -1.29 0.069 NA NA 0.113 NA NA
Saudi Arabia 2.22 2002 4.16 0.077 0.009 0.008 0.159 0.114 0.182
Senegal 1.32 1993 3.93 0.084 0.013 0.015 0.045 0.046 0.039
Serbia 0.17 2008 -6.03 0.052 0.088 0.091 0.128 0.053 0.084
Sierra Leone 3.41 2004 -4.8 0.188 0.014 0.113 0.074 0.145 0.003
Singapore 2.68 1997 -3.8 0.035 0.009 0.009 0.179 0.096 0.062
Slovakia 1.45 2008 -5.52 0.068 0.043 NA 0.098 0.072 NA
Slovenia -0.91 2008 -5 0.053 0.038 0.044 0.087 0.108 0.046
South Africa 1.51 1993 3.18 0.032 0.017 0.019 0.039 0.029 0.017
Spain -0.75 2007 -2.82 0.037 0.029 0.028 0.084 0.04 0.04
Sri Lanka 6.05 2004 2.07 0.04 0.012 0.01 0.063 0.291 0.324
Sudan (Former) -1.22 2010 -5.02 0.094 0.073 0.082 0.123 0.105 0.066
Swaziland 1.26 1990 -4.44 0.019 0.008 0.009 0.108 0.094 0.067
Sweden 2.15 1951 NA 0.01 0 0 0.034 0.011 0.015
Switzerland 0.86 1973 -2.26 0.005 0 0 0.008 0.007 0.005
Syria -8.36 2009 -9.98 0.086 NA NA 0.169 NA NA
Taiwan 3.87 1995 -3.08 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tajikistan 3.07 2008 -3.42 0.061 0.048 0.084 0.174 0.144 0.053
TFYR of Macedonia 1.99 2008 -3.09 0.119 0.047 0.056 0.061 0.136 0.049
Thailand 3.67 2001 4.4 0.067 0.037 0.028 0.157 0.204 0.218
Togo 2.54 2009 3.48 0.124 0.035 0.042 0.062 0.104 0.08
Trinidad and Tobago 0.57 2006 -8.91 0.065 0.028 0.028 0.073 0.038 0.026
Tunisia 0.82 2010 -1.86 0.041 0.095 0.107 0.131 0.098 0.041
Turkey 1.92 2006 -3.85 0.053 0.044 0.041 0.105 0.132 0.198
Turkmenistan 9.56 2004 4.78 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tanzania 3.37 1998 2.38 0.051 0.008 0.011 0.083 0.145 0.13
Uganda 1.48 2010 -3.5 0.101 0.022 0.034 0.112 0.274 0.139
Ukraine -1.58 2007 -9.95 0.249 0.242 0.317 0.113 0.036 0.013
United Arab Emirates 2.43 2010 11.47 0.211 0.093 0.101 0.088 0.087 0.05
United Kingdom 2 1951 NA 0.005 0.004 0 0.02 0.019 0.004
United States 2.03 1951 NA 0.001 0 0 0.008 0.002 0.001
Uruguay 4.91 2003 8.04 0.09 0.008 0.009 0.092 0.141 0.108
Uzbekistan 6.57 2003 3.91 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Venezuela -2.1 2008 -10.77 0.08 NA NA 0.084 NA NA
Viet Nam 5.65 1991 2.28 0.018 0.006 0.006 0.092 0.065 0.062
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Country Growth Year Magnitude Average 2015 2016 Average 2015 2016
Yemen -4.57 2010 -6.5 0.046 NA NA 0.138 NA NA
Zambia 4.38 2002 3.22 0.094 0.009 0.011 0.092 0.124 0.1
Zimbabwe 12.13 2008 17.54 0.135 NA NA 0.069 NA NA
Notes: Trend growth estimates based on data up to and including 2015, except for Syria (growth data
stops in 2014). Hazard estimates based on model in Table 5. Trend rates extracted using iFF with the
following assumptions:
Minimum trend growth duration: 5 years
Trend shifts signiﬁcance ﬁlter: 1% pt. change for a shift in the same direction. 3% pts. change for a
shift in the opposite direction.
Example of how to read the table: China has been growing at 6.81% p.a. since 2008 (last trend shift in
2007). 2007 was a trend down-shift, hence a further down-shift would be identiﬁed as a ≤ 5.81% p.a.
average growth rate over the next ≥ 5 years, whereas an up-shift would be a ≥ 9.81% p.a. average
growth rate over the same period. In 2016, the conditional probabilities of trend down and up-shifts are
17.3% and 1% respectively.
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